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State Action* 
WILLIAM w. VAN Ar.sTYNEt AND KENNETH L. KARsT:t: 
I. STATE AcnoN AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST IN RAciAL EQUALITY 
Not since the Civil War has the demand for racial equality 
pressed down on the national conscience so heavily as during this 
past decade. And not since the era of Reconstruction have the 
federal courts been called upon so frequently to establish constitu-
tional standards for racial equality. The framing of the judicial 
response to this demand is doubly complicated. First, judges must 
construct acceptable substantive standards out of the magnificent 
ambiguities of the Civil War amendments. At the same time, they 
must reconcile the plea for a uniform national standard with the 
traditional limitation of the amendments-a limitation which con-
fines constitutional guarantees to protection from abusive "state 
action" alone. Although these two objectives are indivisible, they 
are ordinarily treated as though they were separate; our purpose 
in this article is to identify the functions of the state action limi-
tation, and to suggest a specific accommodation of those functions 
to the demand for racial equality. 
Recent fashion requires the recitation of arguments in favor of 
a single national standard of racial equality. It is said that (a) the 
increased influence of Asian and Mrican nations on world affairs 
requires that America's reputation abroad not be jeopardized by ra-
cial barriers to individual advancement at home; (b) the race prob-
lem has migrated with the Negro to the North and West, until it 
is no longer a regional concern but a national one; and (c) racial 
discrimination results in a waste of the nation's human resources 
which is intolerable at a time of external peril. 
For our part, although we do not take issue with any of these 
rationalizations, we are prepared to recognize them as just thae 
We are content to rest the case for national constitutional protection 
• Because state action cases historically have tended to be concerned with racial 
equality (see te.xt accompanying notes 2-5 infra) and because of the need to deal with the 
state action limitation in particular conte.xts, this article concentrates on selected aspects of 
the race problem. But we believe that the analysis is also useful in other state action con-
te.xts; hence the breadth of the title. 
t B.A., University of Southern California, 1955; LL.B., Stanford University, 1958; 
Associate Professor of Law, The Ohio State University. 
+A.B., University of California, Los Angeles, 1950; LL.B., Harvard University, 1953; 
Associate Professor of Law, The Ohio State University. 
I. Cj. Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 150 (1955). 
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of racial equality on a belief, by no means uniformly supported by 
history, that freedom and security are unitary, and that the national 
conscience cannot be free so long as opportunity depends on the 
accident of skin color. We note also that a costly civil war was 
fought partly to secure the racial justice which, so their framers 
thought, the three Civil War amendments would protect for the 
future. We thus take the question of the nation's interest in racial 
equality as settled, both morally and historically. 
What has particularly distinguished the racial equality cases 
from other civil liberties cases arising under the fourteenth amend-
ment is their preoccupation with the state action limitation; indeed, 
most of the shifts in state action theory first made their appearance 
in the race cases. Historical explanations for this novel preoccupa-
tion are likely to be little more than guesses, but two may be sug-
gested. ( r) Other interests of a constitutional dimension have 
continually required protection from action which is easily identi-
fied as governmental. Those who struggle to protect free speech, 
for example, have their hands full with government; they have 
little spare time for the more sophisticated forms of private repres-
sion. As a consequence, the battle lines have formed around the 
substantive definition of the rights in question rather than the 
source of threats to the rights. In contrast, the substantive defini-
tion of racial equality has been settled at least to the point where 
those states inclined to discriminate against Negroes have recog-
nized that they cannot succeed through legislation. Since racial 
discrimination as a straightforward state policy has been denied by 
the Constitution, tl1ere has followed a subtle but deliberate delega-
tion of the enforcement of the policy to private hands. The legis-
lative "repeal" of the common-law duties of innkeepers2 is only 
one recent example of a time-tested practice elsewhere manifest 
in the history of voting rights.3 On the level of constitutional doc-
trine, opponents of racial equality discovered early that if they were 
to succeed with reasoned argument, they had to address themselves 
to a subject on which they were likely to find adherents. The ero-
sion of the "separate but equal" principle, visible long before 1954-, 
required them to make their stand on the principle of the Civil 
Rights Cases.4 
2. See note 124 infra. 
3. See text accompanying note 49 infra. 
4. 109 u.s. 3 (1883). 
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(2) Other constitutionally protected interests have found early 
and active support from within state governments, while the in-
terest in racial equality has been virtually ignored by the states most 
seriously affected by racial problems. Mr. Justice Bradley seemed 
to assume, in his Civil Rights Cases opinion, that local responsi-
bility would secure the same protection against racial discrimina-
tion as it did against other invasions of constitutionally protected 
interests.r;; The failure of this hope need not be recounted here; it 
will suffice to say that even a great judge is capable of that form of 
judicial lawmaking which proceeds from ignorance of a problem's 
factual setting to assumptions based on ignorance, and thence to 
the erection of constitutional principles based on the assumptions. 
The abdication of local responsibility for assuring racial equality 
has no doubt contributed to an increased willingness of the Su-
preme Court to offer protection in the form of national constitu-
tional standards, applicable to more and more activities previously 
considered "private." 
Whatever the explanation, the effort of the courts to give mean-
ing to the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments has resulted in a 
variety of state action doctrines jutting out like the several un-
related heads of a hydra. Since the motivations for decisions to 
grant or withhold constitutional protection against various forms 
of quasi-private action are kept hidden, ad hoc decisions feed on 
themselves. The task is not simply to create constitutional doctrine 
which is coherent, but to reach sound results in concrete cases-re-
sults which give proper weight to the values embodied in the state 
action limitation. 
II. AN APPROACH To THE FoURTEENTH AND FIFTEENTH 
AMENDMENTS 
In which of the following cases could the national authority 
intervene to provide some kind of remedy for the aggrieved Ne-
groes? 
Case r: A private political association assists prospective white 
voters by advising them of registration deadlines and voting pro-
cedures; it refuses to provide such a service for prospective Negro 
voters. 
Case 2: An impostor who has stolen a policeman's badge stops 
5. 109 U.S. at 17. 
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a Negro, falsely accuses him of disturbing the peace, and then beats 
him severely. 
Case 3: An independent gas station owner .fires his only Negro 
employee and establishes a firm policy of not hiring Negroes. 
Case 4: A homeowner permits white children to play on an 
adjoining lot, but refuses to permit Negro children to play there. 
Each of these discriminatory policies might be the result of 
state legislation instead of a private decision. Thus, a state agency 
might be substituted for the private political association; a state law 
might provide civil and criminal relief from assault in general, but 
make an express exception for assaults on Negroes; a state law 
might forbid the employment of Negroes in gas stations; or a state 
law might forbid homeowners from permitting Negro children 
to use their property. In each of these cases, there would be a de-
nial of constitutional rights which Congress, or the federal courts, 
clearly could redress. 
In the present condition of constitutional doctrine, however, it 
is unlikely that section 5 of the fourteenth amendment or section 2 
of the fifteenth would support federal legislation to provide relief 
in any of these cases, as originally described. The explanation 
which might be expected is not, for example, that "equal protec-
tion" has not been denied, but rather that no "state" has denied it. 
That the standard explanation is unsatisfactory is plain enough.6 
It is politically unsatisfactory because a "misleading search for 'state 
action' "1 has spawned a host of theories which, taken literally or 
even seriously, cannot be applied generally. When a court quite 
sensibly refuses to apply its announced doctrine because that doc-
6. Much of what we say at this point has been said or implied before by a number of 
writers. Most writings to date have analyzed the various kinds of formal connections with 
government which may satisfy the state action requirement. E.g., Abernathy, Expansion 
of the State Action Concept Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 CoRNELL L.Q. 375 
(1958); Barnett, What Is "State" Action Under the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Nineteenth 
Amendments of the Constitution?, 24 ORE. L. REv. 227 (1945); Lewis, The Meaning of 
State Action, 60 Count. L. REv. 1083 (1960); Note, State Action, 1 RAcE REL. L. REP. 
613 (1956). Others have been more critical of the formulas themselves, without offering 
as a substitute any generalized identification of the interests which the state action limita-
tion represents. E.g., Berle, Constittltional Limitations on Corporate Activity-Protection 
of Personal Rjghts From Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REv 933 
(1952); Hale, Force and the State: A Comparison of "Political" and "Economic" Com-
pulsion, 35 CoLUM. L. REv. 149 (1935); Hale, Rjghts Under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments Against Injuries Inflicted by Private Individuals, 6 LAw. GuiLD REv. 627 
(1946); Horowitz, The Misleading Search for "State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 30 So. CAL. L. REv. 208 (1957). Two e.'Cceptionally thoughtful studies of the "pri-
vate government" problem are GELLHORN, AMERICAN RIGHTS ch. 9, especially pp. 192-95 
(1960), and PEKELIS, LAw AJ>lD SociAL ACTioN 91-128 (1950). The e.'Ctensive literature 
of state action is noted in Lewis, supra. 
7. See Horowitz, supra note 6. 
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trine does not meet the needs of the case at hand, it invites the 
criticism that it has abandoned principle for expediency.8 Finally, 
the traditional state action doctrine is unsatisfactory as a guide for 
judicial action because it directs attention to formal questions in-
stead of the real interests which compete for constitutional recog-
nition. 
Any proper discussion of the cases outlined above must there-
fore begin with recognition that the state action requirement is no 
more unitary than the requirement that equal protection has been 
denied. These verbal formulations are simply an awkward short-
hand to describe a multiplicity of interests which compete for re-
spect in each case. Among these interests are several which are 
functionally related to the presence or absence of participation by 
a government in the alleged constitutional invasion. Thus while 
the search for a merely formal connection-for "state action"-is 
misleading, the search for the values which stand behind the state 
action limitation is indispensable. 
This search can be made more meaningful by recognizing three 
distinctive aspects of decision making under the fourteenth and 
fifteenth amendments. Their statement here in such embarrassing 
simplicity would be patronizing were it not for the Supreme 
Court's frequent success in obscuring them. 
First: The identification of the personal interests of the parties 
affected by the incident which gave rise to the case.-It is assumed 
that individuals have some interests which governments lack. 
When a housewife chooses to do all her shopping at the A&P rather 
than at the corner grocery-for whatever reason or for no reason 
at all-she affects the business of both stores; but she also manifests 
an interest personal to herself, her freedom of choice. The protec-
tion of her freedom, even when it is used capriciously, is sufficiently 
important that the housewife is not to be subjected to any national 
standard of "reasonableness" in its exercise. Should the state legis-
lature subsidize the A&P or tax the corner grocery, however, it 
cannot assert an equivalent personal interest to insulate its action 
from review according to a national standard of reasonableness. 
For unlike the housewife, the state is not an individual being whose 
personal interest in its own unrestricted freedom to choose is in-
jured by confining it to certain national standards. Lacking a per-
8. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 
1 (1959). 
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sonal interest in the freedom of its own choice, the state must show 
justification for the effects of its activity on the interests of persons. 
In deciding whether certain conduct shall be subjected to national 
standards of reasonableness, it therefore becomes important to iden-
tify the particular parties and to identify those specific interests 
which are affected in some manner by the transaction in question. 
It will be seen, however, that recognition of these interests may not 
result from a search for state action based on formal connections 
with governments. 
Second: The assessment of the impact on these personal inter-
ests which will result from a decision that the national authority-
Congress or a court-is or is not free to intervene.-This is simply 
a restatement of the usual constitutional balance, focused narrowly 
on the question of the need for national intervention. Such a need 
may be great when a state government has participated formally 
in an invasion of a constitutionally protected interest, but it may 
be equally great when the invasion by private action is severe 
enough. This is not to say that constitutional guarantees should 
be applied wholesale to corporations or labor unions, but merely 
that under some circumstances the action of private groups suffi-
ciently resembles governmental action to justify federal (not neces-
sarily judicial) intervention. 
Third: The assessment of the effect of such a decision on the 
policy of encouraging local responsibility.-Much of the attraction 
of a federal system lies in the value of decentralizing some adminis-
trative and policy-making functions. The language of state action 
in the Civil War amendments makes appropriate an explicit recog-
nition of the values of federalism in the civil rights context. 
Frank attention to these values, implicit in the shorthand of 
state action, should do much to promote a principled application of 
constitutional guarantees. The neglect of the values has resulted 
not from judicial bias but from a kind of verbal inertia, which often 
leads the Supreme Court to write broad doctrines which seem to 
foreclose a more particularized analysis. Since a narrower approach 
seems to us to be more helpful in the long run,9 we shall treat sepa-
rately, in several factual settings, the interests at stake-interests 
which compete for judicial protection under the misleadingly uni-
tary label of state action. 
9. See Karst, Legislative Facts in Constittltional Litigation, 1960 SUP. CT. REv. 75, 
82-86. 
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III. FREEDOM FROM BRUTALITY 
The Constitution traditionally has required a finding of some 
formal connection between the state and a person prosecuted or 
sued under federal statutes for acts of brutality/0 since the statutes11 
are derived from section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. Bearing 
in mind that fourteenth amendment orthodoxy does not acknowl-
edge a "right" of bodily integrity, but merely establishes a limited 
immunity from physical abuse by the "state," in which of the fol-
lowing cases could Congress provide relief for the victim? 
Case 5: A police officer while on duty formally arrests a Negro 
for having violated a state law and then beats him severely. 
Case 6: Mter making a formal arrest, an officer removes his 
badge, declares that he is no longer acting in the name of the law, 
and beats the Negro severely. 
Case 7: A police officer while off duty presents his badge to a 
Negro, pretending to arrest him, and then beats him severely. 
Case 8: An impostor who has stolen a policeman's badge stops 
10. United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882); United States v. Powell, 151 Fed. 
648 (N.D. Ala. 1907); Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 14 (1906) (dictum); see 
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 555 (1875) (dictum). See also Civil Rights 
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), which, while not concerned with brutality, assuredly contributed 
more to the enigma of state action than any other cases. 
11. With 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1958) having been held not to embrace fourteenth amend-
ment rights, United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70 (1951), the principal criminal pro-
vision is 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1958); its efficacy, however, at least as viewed by one who now 
shares responsibility for enforcing it, is made doubtful by the mens rea standard required 
as a result of Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945). See Putzel, Federal Civil Rights 
Enforcement: A Cu"ent Appraisal, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 439, 450 (1951). 
For a suggestion that the "willfulness" standard is not impossible, however, see Wil-
liams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951); Clark v. United States, 193 F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 
1951); Crews v. United States, 160 F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1947). See also the tantalizing words 
of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 207 (1961) (dissenting 
opinion). 
On the civil side, the principal statute is undoubtedly REv. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 (1958), since its reinvigoration in Monroe v. Pape, supra. See also Hardwick 
v. Hurley, 289 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1961). REv. STAT.§ 1980 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) 
(1958), was virtually discarded after Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951), but the 
failure of local responsibility which was doubtless the compelling justification for the 
Monroe decision, supra, might also lead to a reconsideration of Collins. 
The broad language of the Civil Rights Acts, together with their age-all were enacted 
against the background of the Civil ·war-has caused the federal courts to exercise caution 
in their application. See Freund, Federal-State Relations in the Opinions of fudge Ma-
gruder, 72 HARv. L. REv. 1204, 1213-19 (1959); Note, The Proper Scope of the Civil 
Rights Acts, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1285 (1953). Precedents among the cases interpreting these 
statutes should not be taken to mean that modern federal civil rights legislation would 
receive either a similarly narrow interpretation of their scope or a restrictive view of their 
constitutionality. 
The judicial reception of the 1957 Civil Rights Act, 71 Stat. 634, 42 U.S.C. § 1975c 
(1958), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1975c (Supp. II, 1961), has been cordial, save in a few 
southern federal courts. See, e.g., Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960); United States 
v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960). See also United States v. Alabama, 362 U.S. 602 (1960) 
(applying 1960 Civil Rights Act, 74 Stat. 86, 42 U.S.C. § 197l(c) (Supp. II, 1961)). 
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a Negro, falsely accuses him of disturbing the peace, and beats him 
severely. (This was our Case 2.12) 
Case 9: A private citizen stops a Negro without pretense of 
acting under color of law and beats him severely. 
Case zo: A person who is drunk commits an assault upon an-
other. 
Given the standard characterization of the fourteenth amend-
ment, one schooled in common-law notions of agency-which 
limit a principal's responsibility for the acts of his representative-
would not suppose that federal law could constitutionally reach 
even Case 5 and certainly not Case 6 nor those that follow. As an 
agent for the state, the police officer has clearly exceeded the scope 
of his authority and has nominally violated the explicit orders of 
his principal, i.e., he has violated the criminal laws and the con-
stitution of the state.13 
Where no other means of redressing the victim's grievance 
have appeared, however, the Supreme Court has extended the four-
teenth amendment to avoid what would otherwise be an intoler-
able result.14 But this doctrinal extension has been accomplished 
without any abandonment of the jargon of state action. Thus, if 
the language of the Court is to be believed, Case 9 cannot be reached 
by congressional legislation, notwithstanding justifications which 
are at least as urgent as those which exist in Cases 6 through 8. The 
same language suggests that Congress may or may riot reach Cases 
6 through 8 depending on considerations which seem insignificant 
in the constitutional context. 
Troubled by the necessity of relating the formal requirement 
of state action to conduct by a state agency violative of state law, 
the Court has reasoned that a sufficient connection exists if "the 
wrong itself is rendered possible or is efficiently aided by the state 
authority lodged in the wrongdoer.m5 Whether the "rendered pos-
12. Pp. 5-6 supra. 
13. See Barney v. City of New York, 193 U.S. 430 (1904); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 
313 (1879). See also Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 17 (1944) (concurring opinion). 
14. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); Iowa-Des Moines Nat'! Bank v. 
Bennett, 284 U.S. 239 (1931); Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 
(1913); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879); see Hale, Unconstittttional Acts as Federal 
Crimes, 60 HARv. L. REv. 65, 78-93 (1946). See also HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL 
CounTs AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 825-33 (1953); Hale, Rights Under the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments Against Injuries Inflicted hy Private Individuals, 6 LAw. Gun.n 
REv. 627 (1946). 
15. Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 287 (1913). (Em-
phasis added.) See also Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951); United States v. 
Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). 
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sible" or the "efficiently aided" formulation is to be used, presum-
ably the actor must have been clothed by the state with some real 
or apparent authority which, by definition, he has abused. Thus, 
in the absence of some conduct by a state official which tp.akes 
plausible an outsider's assumption that the actor has in fact been 
authorized to act for the state in some manner, the actor's conduct 
will not satisfy the state action requirement. 
Under the formulations which have thus far come from the 
Supreme Court, then, Cases 9 and 10 appear to be beyond the reach 
of the fourteenth amendment, even supported by enforcing legis-
lation. Cases 6 and 7 are within the state action lines drawn by 
Williams v. United States/6 provided that the victim's belief in his 
oppressor's authority contributed to his failure to resist.17 The main 
opinion in Screws v. United States may support a conclusion that 
there is state action in Case 8, because it equated "color of law" with 
mere "pretense" of law.18 On orthodox analysis, however, Case 8 
is doubtful. Should the power of Congress19 to punish acts of bru-
tality be limited along these lines? Is it sensible that Congress may 
16. 341 U.S. 97, 100 (1951): "We need go no further to conclude that the lower 
court • • • was correct in holding that petitioner was no mere interloper but had a sem-
blance of policeman's power from Florida." 
17. Case 6 is fully analogous to Cadette v. United States, 132 F.2d 902 (4th Cir. 
1943), in which a deputy sheriff went through the motions of "arresting" several Jehovah's 
Witnesses and then participated in beating them only after he "removed his badge ••• and 
stated in substance and effect 'What is done from here on will not be done in the name of 
the law.' " Id. at 904. 
See also Crews v. United States, 160 F.2d 746, 750 (5th Cir. 1947): "An officer of the 
law should not be permitted to divest himself of his official authority in actions taken by 
him wherein he acts, or purports, or pretends, to act pursuant to his authority, and where 
one, known by another to be an officer, takes the other into custody in a manner which 
appears on its face to be in the exercise of authority of law, without making to the other 
any disclosure to the contrary, such officer thereby justifies the conclusion that he was acting 
under color of law in making such an arrest." (Emphasis added.) And see Koehler v. 
United States, 189 F.2d 711 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 852 (1951). 
18. 325 U.S. 91, Ill (1945). See also the quotations in note 17 supra. 
19. It is significant that the question is directed to the constitutionality of congres-
sional acts which by clear and specific terms would provide the interpretation which Con-
gress itself has given to the fourteenth amendment. The posture of such a case justifies 
greater self-restraint by the Court and greater deference to the liberal interpretation of the 
amendment, for "federal intervention as against the states is ••• primarily ••• for con-
gressional determination in our system as it stands." ·w echsler, The Political Sil/eguards 
of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National 
Government, 54 CoLUM. L. REv. 543, 559 (1954). For admitting that the burden is on 
those who would use federal laws, the representative nature of Congress and its sensitivity 
to local interests-guaranteed by the manner in which it is selected-justify greater def-
erence to an interpretation of constitutional power against local interests than the Court 
might justify without the backing of Congress. ld. ptzSsim. ''This is not to say that the 
Court can decline to measure national enactments by the Constitution when it is called 
upon to face the question in the course of ordinary litigation; the supremacy clause governs 
there as well. It is rather to say that the Court is on weakest ground when it opposes its 
interpretation of the Constitution to that of Congress in the interest of the states, whose 
representatives control the legislative process •••• " Id. at 559. 
12 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14: Page 3 
punish the man who pretends to be a police officer but not the man 
who makes no such pretense, when in both cases the harm done 
may be equally severe and equally removed from any "authentic"20 
command of the state? 
This highly fictionalized analysis is not required by a proper 
interpretation of the state action limitation. In fact such "stand-
ards" tend to draw the Court away from making inquiries which 
are relevant. The critical issue here may be the availability of local 
remedies to protect a racial minority from brutality; and although 
this consideration seems plainly to have influenced the Court, it 
remains unexpressed, submerged below the artificialities which 
dominate the opinions. 
A. The Personal Interests Involved 
Do the interests of the aggrieved class outweigh the interests of 
those adversely affected by protecting that class, so that Congress 
should be constitutionally free to extend some protection? The 
answer involves a value judgment, of course, but not one with 
respect to which many are likely to disagree. The interest of the 
Negro here is essentially in freedom from serious bodily harm, 
from pain and hurt. The interest is as elemental and precious as 
any we know. There is, however, a competing interest, and in 
this respect personal brutality may be distinguished from harms 
which are not accomplished by individuals, but only as a result of 
repressive state legislation. A legislature does not express a personal 
interest of its own; rather, it articulates a rule to express and 
enforce the collective personal interests of others who comprise 
some part of the body politic. To this extent it is easier to find state 
action in legislative acts than in acts committed by other state offi-
cials.21 In our hypothetical cases, however, there is a personal in-
terest involved, because the effect on the Negro is not the result of 
an impersonal statute, but it is an effect of another person's indi-
vidual choice to act in a certain way. Significantly, this may be so 
whether or not the assailant is an officer. For unless the officer is 
acting under compulsion of law-as a ministerial automaton-
what he does involves an assertion of his individual desires. The 
same is true of the person pretending to be an officer, and-more 
20. See Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 17 (1944) (concurring opinion); Screws v. 
United States, 325 U.S. 91, 147-48 (1945) (dissenting opinion); Raymond v. Chicago 
Traction Co., 207 U.S. 20, 41 (1907) (dissenting opinion). 
21. See discussion at pp. 7-8 supra. 
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to the point-it is equally true of the assailant who makes no such 
pretense. To the extent that Congress prohibits the expression of 
these desires, it does limit the freedom of those who would other-
wise choose to beat Negroes or anyone else. But such freedoms are 
also customarily limited by local civil and criminal remedies for 
assault; implicidy they rest on a judgment that the interest of some 
in freedom from molestation is greater than the interest of others 
who would express their feelings by molesting. 
On balance, the interest in security from serious physical abuse 
is obviously to be preferred. There is no reason to deny to Congress 
the power to protect bodily integrity just because such protection 
impinges adversely on others. The point is, however, that this 
proposition is equally valid whether we are talking about brutality 
by police officers or brutality by "private" individuals. Since there 
is nothing to distinguish police brutality from private brutality 
(with respect to the personal interests affected by the use of national 
authority), there is no reason on this basis to invoke a state action 
distinction in describing or circumscribing federal power. 
B. The Impact of National Nonintervention on the Right of Bodily 
Integrity 
Should it appear that the Negro's interest in freedom from 
bodily harm is only rarely or lighdy infringed by one class of 
persons, but more frequendy and severely infringed by another, 
there might be reason to deny to Congress the power to reach the 
first group while enabling it to reach the second.22 Where the 
private-state dichotomy accurately describes such a distinction, 
nothing is lost and something may be gained by use of the state 
action formula to help decide whether federal legislation is appli-
cable or constitutional. But the assumption that a state action re-
quirement serves to promote a distinction based on different de-
grees of impact should be re-examined for each class of cases. With 
respect to brutality, the assumption is unquestionably wrong and 
should not be used to foreclose federal protection of interests in 
freedom from bodily harm whether the harm comes from Case 5 
or Case 9· 
22. Prior to Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.167 (1961)., the lower federal courts interpreted 
REv. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958), substantially in this manner, so as 
to reach only recurring and systematic abuses by police against identifiable classes of persons. 
See, e.g., Swanson v. McGuire, 188 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Ill. 1960), for a brief discussion 
and reference to cases. 
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The assumption is unjustified because the private party in Case 
9 may harm his victim just as much as the police officer in Case 5· 
How much harm he causes is the function of how strong he is, how 
well armed, and how malicious, and not whether he acts in the 
name of the law. On the quantitative side of the "impact" inquiry, 
there is no reason to assume that police officers are more likely to 
beat up Negroes than are private persons, even though the nature 
of their occupation may frequently bring them into contact with 
others under charged conditions tending to violence. Certainly the 
"private" brutality illustrated in Case 9 accounts for a greater num-
ber of serious infringements on bodily integrity than brutality ac-
counted for by those few individuals described in Case 6, a case 
in which one federal court has already sustained the application 
of federal law. 23 
C. Countervailing State Interests in the Treatment of Bodily In-
tegrity 
The foregoing discussion has focused on the personal interests 
which may be affected by the scope of protection offered by the 
fourteenth amendment against private brutality with varying de-
grees of connection with official policy. We proceed now to con-
sider some of the institutional interests which underlie the state 
action requirement. 
I. Congressional Power and Local Responsibility. In Cases 5 
through IO above, there is no statement whether state law provides 
civil or criminal remedies to vindicate the victim's interest and to 
deter future wrongs of a similar character. Neither do the facts 
disclose whether such remedies are actually available to the victim, 
assuming, as we surely may, that the state legislature has nominally 
provided them as a matter of statutory law. Under the orthodox 
agency approach to state action, such facts might not even be con-
sidered relevant if it were otherwise clear that the brutality was 
caused by a private person not even pretending to act as a police 
officer. But the Supreme Court cannot help being influenced by 
information of this kind, and properly so, because it goes directly 
to considerations of local responsibility in the allocation of power 
between Congress and the states. 
To sustain the validity of a federal statute which punishes acts 
of brutality committed by police officers or private individuals, 
23. Cadette v. United States, 132 F.2d 902 (4th Cir. 1943), discussed in note 17 stlpra. 
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when it is clear that the state itself stands ready to vindicate the in-
terest, may damage a valuable feature of our federal system. Such 
a course may discourage the local community from responding to 
local abuses, and it may unnecessarily induce increased reliance on 
the blunt instruments of central authority. Doubdess these con-
siderations have served as a restraining influence on the Court's 
willingness to acknowledge congressional authority to act to pro-
tect even vital interests across the board.24 This much is perhaps 
too obvious to merit restatement, but we think that the converse is 
equally obvious as a principle of fourteenth amendment construc-
tion; the maxim cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex serves the 
Constitution as well as it serves the common law. 
Whether the application of federal law to protect a personal 
interest from serious abuse by others will adversely affect our com-
mon interest in promoting local responsibility, is an issue to be 
considered anew in each case. It is not enough to postulate a priori 
that to apply a federal law punishing acts of brutality might induce 
a la..'rity in the enforcement of local remedies, and thus to conclude 
that application of the federal law is unwarranted.25 If the historic, 
uniform custom of the state has been to ignore serious crimes 
against a particular class of persons, may we not sometimes con-
clude that the community has abdicated its responsibility not from 
reliance on Congress, but from prejudice against the affected class? 
The tragic history of Mack Charles Parker affords an example. 
In that case, a Negro in jail was seized and murdered by a mob of 
white men, some of whom were specifically identified in the en-
suing investigation by the FBI. The FBI report was made available 
to an all-white Mississippi grand jury which, taking its lead from 
the local white prosecutor, refused to consider the FBI report and 
adjourned. The Justice Department considered prosecuting the 
-case under section 242 of the Criminal Code, but initially decided 
24. Strangely, however, the Court has occasionally used the growth of local responsi-
bility to justify, rather than to forestall, constitutional intervention. In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643, 651 (1961), the Court relied on the states' trend to adopt the exclusionary rule 
as reason to e."{tend the rule against all states by fourteenth amendment fiat. The majority 
was sharply admonished by Mr. Justice Harlan: "[T]he very fact on which the majority 
relies, instead of lending support to what is now being done, points away from the need of 
~eplacing voluntary state action with federal compulsion." I d. at 680 (dissenting opinion). 
25. Thus, when Mr. Justice Frankfurter unsuccessfully urged that 18 U.S.C. § 241 
(1958) should be restricted to obvious kinds of state action from apprehension that a con-
trary construction might "weaken the habits of local law enforcement by tempting reliance 
on federal authority," Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 149 (1945) (dissenting opin· 
ion), he appeared t<t assume too readily just what those "habits" really involved by way of 
.adequate police protection for southern Negroes. Compare the concurring opinion of Mr. 
Justice Rutledge, id. at 114 & n.5. 
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against such a move because it could not tie in the local sheriff or 
his deputies as being sufficiently involved with the mob to satisfy 
the statute's requirement of state action.26 A strict and formal 
interpretation of the state action principle thus insulated local ir-
responsibility, and perhaps even gave positive encouragement to 
further private brutality. 
The Justice Department's inhibited use of section 242 is under-
standable, given the precedents under which it must work. But 
to refrain from prosecuting under such circumstances for the pur-
pose of promoting local responsibility-and to do so by asserting 
that the state action requirement has not been satisfied-is to strain 
the limits of common sense. When an assumption of the kind 
indulged by Mr. Justice Bradley in the Civil Rights Cases27 is in-
accurate, it should not determine the result of the case. 
Given such circumstances, Case 9 is really no different from 
Case 5· Case ro, involving a drunk who assaults another, may or 
may not be different, partly depending upon whether there is suf-
ficient reason to believe that the victim can secure redress within 
the community. The inquiry will be the same in any of these cases, 
whether the victim is a Negro or not; the fact that he is a Negro 
is merely helpful in determining why he could not secure local 
relief, i.e., whether relief was withheld because of local prejudice 
against members of his class. The resolution of the state action 
question would be equally affected by a refusal to vindicate the 
rights of a white person in a community where law enforcement 
was prejudicially administered by Negroes, or by local indifference 
to the rights of a Jehovah's Witness in a community where the law 
was the captive of patriotic zealots. 
Suggesting this analysis, therefore, is not to maintain that the 
state action concept should be read out of the amendment for race 
cases, even though the analysis may support the application of fed-
26. N.Y. Times, April 26, I959, p. I, col. 7; id., p. 47, col. 4; id., April 27, I959, 
p. I, col. 2; id., May 26, I959, p. 20, col. 3; id., Nov. I8, I959, p. I, col. 4. On reconsider-
ation, in view of the irresponsibility of the Mississippi local grand jury, the Justice Depart-
ment altered its earlier decision not to prosecute the case and did convene a federal grand 
jury in Mississippi. Id., Jan. 4, I960, p. I, col. 5. The charge of the presiding judge made 
it clear that some connection between the lynch mob and a state official would have to be 
established, id., Jan. 5, p. I2, col. 4, id., Nov. 6, I959, p. I8, col. 4 (noting the state action 
problem), and ultimately even the federal grand jury was unable to return a true bill. lti., 
Jan. 27, I960, p. I9, col. 3. 
27. I09 U.S. 3, 17, 24 (I883): "[The Negroes'] rights remain in full force, and may 
presumably be vindicated by. resort to the laws of the State for redress • • • [these rights 
are] properly cognizable by the laws of the State, and presumably subject to redress by 
those laws •••• " 
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eral law to some private brutality. When the community dis-
charges its responsibility by applying local remedies in an equal-
handed fashion on behalf of all who are brutalized, there is reason 
to respect the state's responsibility and to encourage it by with-
holding federal intervention. Thus not all private abuses, even 
of Negroes, would result in the automatic availability of federal 
remedies. 
We cannot, of course, ignore the difficulties in determining 
whether local government has discharged its responsibilities in 
such a manner that federal authority ought to be withheld. Most 
assuredly, a constitutional distinction of the kind proposed will 
require careful inquiry in each case by the federal courts and by 
the Justice Department. Consider the following situations sur-
rounding the murder of a Negro by a white man who made no 
pretense of acting under color of law: 
One. Traditionally and throughout the state no effort has been 
made to identify, arrest, prosecute, or punish murderers of Negroes, 
and this custom is practiced in this case as well. 
Two. Traditionally, such offenders have been punished in most 
of the state, but such offenders are not punished in this county and 
the local practice is followed in this case. 
Three. Traditionally, such offenders have been punished, but 
in this case the local police have done nothing for eight months 
when the Justice Department is asked to intervene. 
Four. The local police conduct a full investigation and turn 
over evidence warranting prosecution to a local grand jury which 
ignores the evidence and returns no true bill. 
Five. The grand jury indicts but the petit jury acquits, not-
withstanding an overwhelming case established by the prosecution. 
Six. The petit jury convicts, but the judge imposes the lightest 
sentence permissible under state law, contrary to sentences uni-
formly handed down in cases different only in that Negroes were 
not the victims. 
Given any of these assumptions, there should be no necessary 
obstacle to a federal prosecution of the offender. But they are as-
sumptions, stated in the easy manner of all hypothetical cases. In 
a flesh-and-blood case the federal judge cannot escape deciding on 
the basis of meager evidence whether such a failure of local re-
sponsibility has taken place. This determination is necessary in 
order to satisfy the constitutional requirement of state action. Even 
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so, the task is no greater than what is asked of courts at the present 
time, nor is it any more difficult than the illogical state action in-
quiry which the Screws opinion demands. The difference is that 
the inquiry responds to the reasons for retaining a state action limi-
tation. 
The alteration proposed to the Court's approach to state action 
could be accomplished fairly easily within the framework of exist-
ing constitutional theory. Mr. Justice Frankfurter was disturbed 
in Snowden v. Hughes28 by a suit in which it was alleged that elec-
tion canvassing board officials had violated their duties under state 
law by failing to certify the plaintiff's nomination: "I am unable 
to grasp the principle on which the State can here be said to deny 
the plaintiff the equal protection of the laws of the State when the 
foundation of his claim is that the Board had disobeyed the authen-
tic command of the State."29 The point was well taken if the board 
had indeed disobeyed the state's authentic command, but it loses its 
force if the Court is free to determine for itself whether the osten-
sible command is authentic. If the state makes a declaration of 
policy through its legislature, but systematically pursues another 
policy through the willful practice of its executive not to apply the 
law, the mere appearance of that law can scarcely be considered the 
authentic command of the state, any more than if the legislature 
itself had written a "Negro exception" into the statute. The point 
has been made elsewhere that the state may be considered to have 
adopted the action of the private citizen as its own to the extent 
that it resolves to withhold otherwise available local remedies.30 
28. 321 u.s. 1 (1944). 
29. Id. at 17. (Emphasis added.) 
30. The proposition is implicit in the state "inaction" cases, e.g., Lynch v. United 
States, 189 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1951); Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 
1945), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 776 (1947); United States v. Given, 25 Fed. Cas. 1324 
(No. 15210) (D. Del. 1873), although these involved actions only against readily ascer-
tainable state officials and not against private citizens. The case of Brewer v. Hoxie School 
Dist., 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956), went quite far in granting injunctive relief against 
private interference partly on the basis of an affirmative responsibility of the state to provide 
equal protection which national power could be used to vindicate. The dicta in the case are 
broad. See 70 HARv. L. REv. 1299, 1300 (1957); 43 VA. L. REv. 255, 257 (1957). 
Of great interest are the writings of Hale, Rights Under the Fo.,'Tteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments Against Injuries Inflicted by Private Individtta!s, 6 LAw. GUILD REv. 627, 
638 (1946): "Let us make the improbable assumption that some state legislature passed a 
statute repealing the law against homicide in so far as it affects lynching. By enacting such 
a statute, the state has potentially deprived persons of life. If lynching can be stopped, 
however, the potential deprivation will not ripen into an actual one. • • • Legislation • • • 
which makes the lynching a federal crime, or which authorizes federal authorities to 
prosecute it in federal courts as a crime under state law as it was before the enactment of 
the unconstitutional statute, would tend to prevent the state's act in withdrawing the 
protection to life from becoming an actual deprivation of life. It is hard to see how it can 
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The thought is implicit, of course, in Mr. Justice Bradley's treat-
ment of the Civil Rights Cases; he presumed the availability oflocal 
remedies but left open the question whether even private wrong-
doers would be beyond the reach of the fourteenth amendment if 
the custom of the state were to withhold relief.31 Similarly, though 
the state may maintain homicide statutes on its books, a decision 
by a state official not to apply those statutes because a Negro is the 
victim is a decision by the state to cloak the oppressor's act with the 
state's permissive authority.82 Thus the impact of private action 
on the interest of the aggrieved class, combined with a discrimina-
tory withholding of local law enforcement protection, justifies the 
application of federal law. The demonstration of official local ir-
responsibility overcomes our initial hesitancy to extend the reach 
of central authority, because our initial confidence in local justice 
was misplaced. 
2. Congressional Power and Local Prerogative. It may be sug-
gested that our approach assumes a too-restricted view of the value 
of local prerogatives in federalism. The implication has been, per-
haps, that the local community should be left free to manage its 
own affairs only to the limited extent of selecting and applying a 
be denied that such federal legislation would be appropriate for the enforcement of the 
[fourteenth] Amendment. 
"It might be argued that it is not the lynchers but the state that violated the Amend-
ment. To this it might be replied that the lynchers ••• were in fact violating the Amend-
ment by bringing to fruition the state's potential deprivation." 
Compare the language from Ex parte Riggins, 134 Fed. 404, 409 (N.D. Ala. 1904) 
(United States v. Powell, 151 Fed. 648 (N.D. Ala. 1907) said Riggins was overruled by 
Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906)): "The power of Congress under the [four-
teenth] amendment, as to the performance of the duty thus enjoined upon the state, has 
therefore a twofold aspect. The first concerns the right to interfere with state Jaws or state 
power. That can be done only when the state is at fault-when the state either refuses to 
afford due process of law, or its officers refuse to execute the laws, or execute them with 
vicious purpose or uneven hand. Then, and not until then, can federal power step in and 
displace or alter state laws, or interfere with state officers. Then the interference with state 
law or power must be confined to dealing with the particular evil, and to providing an 
effective cure for it. The other phase of the power concerns the protection of the rights 
which the amendment gives, though the state may not be at fault, and the power of Con-
gress to aid the state, in the performance of its duty, by removing obstruction or resistance, 
by private lawlessness, to the successful performance of the duty." 
United States v. Given, supra at 1327: "Suppose, as is largely the case in Delaware, 
the state passes no unfriendly act, but neglects to impose penalties upon its election officers 
for making discriminations on account of race or color, and provides no remedy for such 
wrongs, of what value is the constitutional provision unless it means that congress may 
interfere? I think such intervention was contemplated and expressly authorized." 
See also United States v. Hall, 26 Fed. Cas. 79, 81-82 (No. 15282) (S.D. Ala. 1871); 
Abernathy, Expansion of the State Action Concept Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 
CoRNELL L.Q. 375 (1958); Peters, Civil Rlghts and State Non-Action, 34 NoTRE DAME 
LAw. 303 (1959). 
31. See Hale, Force and the State: A Comparison of "Political" and "Economic" 
Compulsion, 35 CoLUM. L. REv. 149, 183-88 (1935). 
32. See ibid; note 30 supra. 
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local remedy for the protection of nationally established values; if 
it does not, then it leaves itself open to federal intervention. An 
objection may be made that a living system of federalism must 
leave other, more significant choices to the local community; under 
such a system the states are free to decide whether some interests 
should be protected at all, in view of competing interests which 
would be denied protection. Should the equal protection clause, 
for example, operate so as to coerce the states to protect all possible 
interests in bodily integrity, even, say, freedom from the negligent 
infliction of emotional distress? Or should the rule be that if the 
community observes a standard of uniformity in leaving an interest 
unprotected, Congress cannot override its determination? 
Suppose the local decision is that no person has a sufficient in-
terest in being free from bodily contact which is not harmful but 
only offensive, in view of the competing interest in freedom of 
action. Such a local decision is worthy of respect precisely because 
there is value in decentralizing the power to make such choices of 
community policy. Where a community has found it advisable to 
deny relief to everyone-not just to Negroes-for such forms of 
bodily contact, has there been the kind of abdication of local re-
sponsibility as constitutionally to support federal legislation? We 
think the answer must be "No," subject to a qualification. 
If the failure to provide any local remedy is in fact a disguised 
attempt to deny a remedy only to a disadvantaged class, and not 
simply a community withdrawal of protection based on its view 
of the relative importance of the competing personal interests at 
stake, there is less reason for respecting the local decision. The in-
terest of Negroes in freedom from offensive bodily contact is in 
the first instance no greater than the similar interest of all other 
persons, but it may be that in some communities Negroes in par-
ticular will be likely to be subjected to such indignities if the state 
remains aloof. If it is clear that the lack of a local remedy is at-
tributable to legislative endorsement of this practice, the situation 
is not substantially different from what it would be if the state 
were to provide civil and criminal remedies for offensive-contact 
batteries, but refuse to enforce them in behalf of Negroes. On this 
assumption, the application of federal relief would be justified; the 
real problem is of course the determination that it is this phenome-
non which accounts for the lack of a local remedy. Such a deter-
mination would perhaps be harder to make in the case of repeal 
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of legislative protections against offensive-contact batteries than in 
the case of legislative abolition of the common-law duties of inn-
keepers, 33 or of state primary election laws, 34 but it would not be 
an impossible one.35 Given a determination by the federal court 
that state-law remedies have been abolished for the purpose of 
"delegating" racial discrimination to private individuals or groups, 
there should be no difficulty in the way of treating the state's legis-
lative action as the equivalent of official adoption of the private 
discrimination. 
The local prerogative to determine which interests are worthy 
of legal protection should be recognized through application of the 
state action requirement, but only when the local determination is 
made for purposes which are constitutionally legitimate. There 
should be no judicial respect for exercises of local prerogative which 
are simply disguises for racial discrimination. This conclusion, we 
concede, rests on the assumption that distinctions in law enforce-
ment policy which are based on race alone are not constitutionally 
legitimate, an assumption for which there is ample support in the 
opinions of the Supreme Court. If it be argued that the suggested 
analysis requires the courts to examine into the purposes and effects 
of legislative action and inaction, the easy answer must be that 
such an examination is hardly new. From the "grandfather clause" 
cases36 to the recent realignment of the borders of Tuskegee, 
Alabama,37 the Supreme Court has often concerned itself with 
legislative purpose,S8 however vigorously it may protest the con-
33. See note 124 infra. 
34. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); 
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Ntxon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); 
Perry v. Cyphers, 186 F.2d 608 (5th Cir. 1951); Baskin v. Brown, 174 F.2d 391 (4th Cir. 
1949); Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948); 
see text accompanying note 49 infra. 
35. See cases cited notes 36-38 infra and the discussion of Hale, note 30 supra. 
36. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915); 
Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 363-64 (1915). "The restrictions imposed must be 
judged with reference to those for whom they were designed." Lane v. Wilson, supra 
at 276. 
37. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); see 22 Omo ST. L.J. 213, 218 nn. 
39,41 (1961). 
38. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 
60 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Korematsu v. United States, 323 
U.S. 214 (1944); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 40 (1915); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, ll8 U.S. 
356 (1886). For recent lower federal court decisions expressly acknowledging the sig-
nificance of legislative purpose in characterizing the effects of minority-oriented statutes, 
see St. Helena Parish School Bd. v. Hall, 287 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1961); Baskin v. Brown, 
174 F.2d 391, 393 (4th Cir. 1949); Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387, 388, 392 (4th Cir. 
1947); Taylor v. Board of Educ., 191 F. Supp. 181, 6 RAcE REL. L. REP. 90 (S.D.N.Y. 
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trary.39 Courts cannot avoid considering the purpose of legislation 
if they are to perform the balancing operation which is at the heart 
of all constitutional lawmaking. When a court weighs a legislative 
objective against its cost to other constitutionally protected interests, 
the balance ought to be struck on the basis of the court's view of the 
real objectives of the legislation, and not simply the declarations of 
noble purpose which appear in its preamble. 
IV. VoTING 
The constitutional interest in equality in the political process is 
undoubtedly high. If a guarantee of racial equality means any-
thing, it must mean that one's race cannot disqualify him from 
participating effectively in the election of officials who make com-
munity decisions which bind him. Particularly in an era of posi-
tive government the interest in voting is basic, because the exercise 
of the vote can help to secure the community's consideration of the 
voter's other interests. Where Negroes do not vote, politicians are 
not notably concerned with their education, housing, employment, 
recreation, or even their treatment by the police. It is thus no solu-
tion to say that Negroes can be protected by the courts from un-
constitutional invasions of their interests at the hands of officials 
chosen in all-white elections. For one thing, the failure to secure 
positive benefits for the Negro community, such as road repairs, 
new parks and the like, is not within reach of the judiciary. Fur-
thermore, state-court judges are chosen in the very elections with 
which we are now concerned. Recognition of the importance of 
voting to the advancement of Negro interests led to the adoption 
of the separate and highly specific fifteenth amendment rather than 
1961); Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 188 F. Supp. 916, 927, 929, 5 RACE REI.. L. 
REP. 1008, 1013, 1024-25 {E.D. La. 1960), enforced, 194 F. Supp. 182, 6 RACE REI.. L. 
REP. 413 (E.D. La. 1961); Wiley v. Richland Water Dist., 5 RAcE REL. L. REP. 788,790 
(D. Ore. June 30, 1960). See also Heyman, The Chief justice, Racial Segregation, and the 
Friendly Critics, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 104, 115-21 (1961). For a wholly unsatisfactory dis-
cussion, see Howell, Legislative Motive and Legislative Purpose in the Invalidation of a 
Civil Rights Statute, 47 VA. L. REv. 439 (1961). For an e.xcellent review of this issue, see 
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 270 F.2d 594, 606-11 (5th Cir. 1959) (dissenting opinion), rev'd, 
364 u.s. 339 (1960). 
39. See, e.g., United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953), and cases cited in Howell, 
rnpra note 38. A comparison of the two lines of cases, i.e., those in which the Court has 
been reluctant to review legislative purpose and those in which it has clearly done so, may 
suggest that its reluctance is largely directed toward sustaining federal statutes concerning 
powers of Congress; this aspect of judicial self-restraint or abstention may not be supported 
by similar considerations in reviewing state laws affecting the civil liberties of disadvantaged 
minorities. Is part of the reason e.xplained by the discussion in note 19 sttpra? 
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reliance on the broader language of the fourteenth/0 and the indi-
rection of its section 2.41 
Further, there is no substantial and legitimate countervailing 
interest in keeping Negroes off the voting rolls. Arguments based 
on the lack of education of many southern Negroes are easily met 
by noting that the states may set their educational qualifications 
high, so long as they enforce the same qualifications against all 
would-be voters. And the notion that white voters will somehow 
protect the Negroes' interests is as false in fact as it is incompatible 
with the democratic theory which confides to each man the oppor-
tunity to represent himself through his ballot. 
It may be suggested that such questions of justification for keep-
ing Negroes out of elections were settled by the fifteenth amend-
ment itself. But the white primary cases raise surprising consider-
ations of justification based on the freedom to associate for political 
purposes. The logical starting point is the case of Terry v. Adams/'2 
which held that the Jaybird Democratic Association's exclusion of 
Negroes violated the fifteenth amendment. 
Four Justices agreed that "Not every private club, association or 
league organized to influence public candidacies or political action 
must conform to the Constitution's restrictions on political parties." 
But, they said, "when a state structures its electoral apparatus in a 
form which devolves upon a political organization the uncontested 
choice of public officials, that organization itself, in whatever dis-
guise, takes on those attributes of government which draw the Con-
stitution's safeguards into play."43 How did the State of Texas 
"structure" its electoral apparatus? By doing nothing; by permit-
ting the Jaybirds to run a pre-primary election to determine the 
candidates the Association would support in the Democratic pri-
mary which followed. How did this failure to act "devolve" upon 
the Jaybirds the choice of officials? There was a fifty-year history 
of Jaybird domination of county elections, virtually unopposed by 
40. Professor Pollak has written persuasively concerning the special implications to be 
drawn from this distinction. Pollak, Racial Discrimination and fttdicial Integrity: A Reply 
to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 19-23 (1959). See also MATHEws, LEGISLA-
TIVE AND }UD!CIAL HISTORY OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 20-22 (1909). 
41. This section authorizes (in terms which seem "mandatory") the reduction of the 
representation of a state in the House of Representatives by the proportion of male citizens 
over the age of twenty-one in the state who are denied the right to vote in federal or state 
elections. The Congress has never made such a reduction. See Bonfield, The Right to Vote 
and Judicial Enforcement of Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 CoRNELL 
L.Q. 108 (1960). 
42. 345 u.s. 461 (1953). 
43. 345 U.S. at 482, 484 (opinion of Clark, J.). (Emphasis added.) 
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other candidates. When a private election of this kind was the only 
one which counted, then state action was to be found in mere per-
mission for the election to be held. 
Three other Justices apparendy would not require the element 
of domination by the private group, so long as its election was di-
rected at the selection of public officers or the decision of public 
issues: "For a state to permit such a duplication of its electoral proc-
esses is to permit a flagrant abuse of those processes to defeat the 
purposes of the Fifteenth Amendment."44 
In many another context the Court had given constitutional 
dimension to the claim of freedom of association; by ignoring the 
claim in the Terry case, the Court invited Professor Wechsler's criti-
cism that it had given protection to some kinds of association for 
unacceptable purposes but not to others, without demonstrating 
that it had made a principled selection.45 In reply, Professor Pollak 
has argued that the fifteenth amendment, with its separate and 
explicit guarantee of racial equality in voting, may be read without 
any state action limitation; or, alternatively, that the state has a 
positive duty to protect the effectiveness of Negro voting, and that 
the failure to perform that duty is sufficient state action to justify 
application of the amendment.46 This reply furnishes a principle, 
but one which seems too broad. If the state action limitation is 
to be dropped from the fifteenth amendment, should not Case I 
above47 (the case concerning registration advice by a private asso-
ciation to whites only) be decided against the political party? And 
if, as we believe, the private conduct in Case I is not reachable under 
the fifteenth amendment, is not the participation of the state the 
key element which is missing ?48 
44. 345 U.S. at 469 (opinion of Black, J.). (Emphasis added.) 
45. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constittltional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 
1 (1959). 
46. See Pollak, supra note 40. 
47. P. 5 supra. 
48. It may be said that the missing element is the denial of the right to vote, and that 
the only arguable constitutional invasion is a denial of equal protection under the four-
teenth amendment. But the terms of the fifteenth cover not only denial of the right to vote, 
but its abridgment as well. It would be unfortunate to limit the fifteenth amendment to 
cases of interference with the physical casting of ballots by Negroes. See United States v. 
Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). The right to vote generally includes the right to be free from 
impediments which render the registering of one citizen's choice more difficult than that 
of others. See United States v. Stone, 188 Fed. 836 (D. Md. 1911). Dilution of one's vote 
by stuffing ballots is an abridgment. See United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944); 
Prichard v. United States, 181 F.2d 326, 331 (6th Cir. 1950) (alternative holding); Led-
ford v. United States, 155 F.2d 574 {6th Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 733 (1946). 
For altering or failing to count ballots, see United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915); 
United States v. Wilson, 72 F. Supp. 812 (W.D. Mo. 1947), afj'd sttb nom. Klein v. United 
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To find our way out of this box it will be helpful to recall the 
functions which the state action requirement performs, and to test 
the facts of Terry v. Adams against them. First, not only was there 
no showing that the state had acted responsibly to assure Negroes 
an effective participation in the vote, but there was a long history 
of calculated irresponsibility. While the decision that the state had 
"denied" the right to vote should probably not rest on the fact that 
the state had moved from official sponsorship of a white primary 
to its then~present status as onlooker, it would be unrealistic to 
assume that the Court paid no attention to the history of Negro 
voting in Texas.49 Since the interest in preserving local responsi-
bility was thus much diminished, an application of the state action 
limitation would have to be supported on other grounds. 
The impact of the Jaybirds' scheme on the constitutionally pro-
tected interest-racial equality in voting-was immense, since the 
scheme deprived every Negro in the county from having his vote 
count as effectively as a white voter's. So the only remaining im-
portant consideration was the justification argument raised by the 
Jaybirds' claim to freedom of association. Of course the State of 
Texas would have no legitimate interest of its own in preserving 
the integrity of a political party, but the Jaybirds' claim may not 
be so lightly dismissed. Must every political combination admit to 
its counsel everyone who seeks admission even though some of the 
applicants hope to sway the combination from its chosen purpose? 
Terry v. Adams need not be read so broadly. It may be taken 
as an affirmation that an asserted justification based on freedom 
of association is not legitimate when the immediate objective of 
the association is the denial of the opportunity for potential voters-
here the Negroes-to have their votes count on the one~man-one­
vote basis which forms the heart of our democracy.50 The freedom 
of association, as justification for the Jaybirds' arrangement, thus 
stands on little better footing than would the freedom to associate 
for the purpose of stuffing ballot boxes. 
States, 176 F.2d 184 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 870 (1949); United States v. Clark, 
19 F. Supp. 981 (W.D. Mo. 1937). 
49. The State of Te.xas had previously been frustrated in its efforts to limit voting of 
Negroes by the devices of a statutory prohibition on Negro voting in the Democratic pri· 
mary, Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927), and a statutory delegation to the party's 
state e':ecutive committee of power to fix qualifications for party membership, Nixon v. 
Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932). The fixing of a racial qualification by the party's state con-
vention received the Supreme Court's blessing until Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 
(1935), was overruled by Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). 
50. Mr. Justice Black's opinion emphasizes strongly the Jaybirds' purpose to deny 
Negroes an effective vote. 345 U.S. at 463-66. 
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This analysis supports the application of the fifteenth amend-
ment to persons who retaliate against Negro voters by means of 
an economic boycott.51 The immediate aim of such an association, 
or expression, is a denial of the vote itself, an aim which is not 
entitled to weight in the constitutional balance. The result sug-
gested extends the fifteenth amendment beyond the range of pres-
ently accepted state action formulas; it does not, however, betray 
the constitutional values which the state action limitation is de-
signed to protect. 
The same reasoning would govern the case of a religious party, 
a case which troubled Professor Wechsler because of its strong 
appeal to the freedom of expression.52 Once such a party becomes 
dominant-in the sense that the Jaybirds were dominant-then its 
pre-primary election cannot be closed to voters of other faiths with-
out denying them their effective political say. Such a suggestion 
may be disturbing to some, or even startling, but it is not new. In 
its strong protection of the right of minority interests to make 
themselves felt in the political process, Terry v. Adams itself is 
only a latter-day echo of Mr. Chief Justice Stone's famous foot-
notes.53 
Then are we to infer that the state action requirement will be 
ignored in Negro voting cases, or that the requirement will be held 
to be satisfied whenever the state fails to prohibit private action 
which has a racially discriminatory effect on voting strength? Not 
at all. If the facts of Case r, above, do not violate the fifteenth 
amendment, the absence of some element which accounts for the 
state action limitation makes the constitutional difference. It is not 
to be found in the degree of the state's formal participation, how-
51. Cf. United States v. Beaty, 288 F.2d 653 (6th Cir. 1961), enjoining landowners 
from threatening economic reprisals against Negro sharecroppers for the purpose of inter-
fering with their voting. The injunction was based on the portion of the 1957 Civil Rights 
Act which is derived from congressional power over federal elections, 71 Stat. 637 (1957), 
42 U.S.C. § 197l(c) (1958). See also Comment, Judicial Protection of Minority Voting 
lOghts: The Case for Constitutional Reform, 22 Omo ST. L.J. 390, 394, 411 (1961). 
52. Wechsler, supra note 45, at 29. Of course, protection against religious or other 
nonracial discrimination in voting would be based on the fourteenth amendment, not the 
fifteenth. 
53. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); cf. South 
Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184 n.2 (1938); Southern 
Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 n.2 (1945). 
At least one writer is prepared to go all the way with the hierarchy-of-values approach, 
abandoning state action altogether as a prerequisite to the protection of "matters of high 
public interest." See St. Antoine, Color Blindness But Not Myopia: A New Look at State 
Action, Equal Protection, and "Private" Discrimination, 59 MicH. L. REv. 993, 1010-11, 
1016 (1961). 
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ever, for here, as in Terry, the state is a bystander. Rather the dis--
tinction rests on the other interests at stake. In Terry v. Adams, 
Negroes were excluded entirely from the county's only meaningful 
election; in Case I there is no exclusion of Negroes from voting, 
but only a denial of a convenience which will assist them in voting. 
Furthermore, there is a legitimate justification based on the free-
dom of political association and expression of the persons who have 
formed the private association; this association does not have as 
an immediate objective the closing of the election to Negroes. This 
distinction, we admit, rests squarely on an assumption of demo-
cratic principle: it is permissible to minimize your opposition's 
electoral strength by winning adherents who will support you at 
the polls, but it is not permissible to achieve the same result by pre-
venting the opposition's votes from being counted fairly. A simi-
lar assumption underlies the first amendment's reliance on more 
speech as our chief protection against bad speech. 
Case II: If the state is substituted for the political party in 
Case I, the impact on the Negroes' interest in voting is the same, 
but there is no countervailing interest in political expression on the 
part of the state. Further, the inference of local irresponsibility is 
strong. 
Case 12: Now the political party which offers voting informa-
tion also provides transportation to the polls and other services, 
so that the party's candidates always win. The party's dominance 
suggests an analogy to Terry v. Adams, but the analogy is not per-
fect. The Negro's constitutionally protected interest is not the in-
terest in winning the election, but in having his vote counted with 
the same weight as the vote of any other individual. Thus the im-
pact of the political party's conduct on that interest does not differ 
significantly from the impact in Case I. 
It will be seen that this approach suggests the possibility of some 
results which may be unpalatable on the basis of the current doc-
trinal emphasis on the need for some formal action by the state. 
Thus, if a single white man kidnaps a single Negro and keeps him 
away from the polls on the day of a state election, the impact on 
the Negro's interest in voting is every bit as severe as that in Terry 
v. Adams, although it is limited to one man. 5 4 And the justification 
for the kidnaper's conduct is even less substantial and less legitimate 
54. Such physical coercion, however, may also have intimidating effects on the whole 
Negro community. 
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than the Jaybirds' justification. The only remaining reason for 
withholding an application of the fifteenth amendment (for ex-
ample, by way of prosecution under the Federal Civil Rights Acts) 
is embodied in the principle of local responsibility. But should the 
local community fail to discipline the kidnaper, it seems to us rea-
sonable that the national authority should be free to intervene.Ga 
V. EDUCATION 
The need for imposing the requirements of equal protection on 
private schools is far from pressing, for two reasons. Outside the 
South, most of these schools and virtually all those which are par-
ticularly sought after because of their reputation have shown litde 
disposition to exclude Negroes. Furthermore, the interest of most 
Negroes in private education is now indeed academic, because high 
costs erect a barrier nearly as severe as the racial barrier. Substan-
tial integration in private education will have to wait until desegre-
gation in employment and in public education provides the means 
for Negroes to attain higher economic status. 
Most states have taken no official interest in the racial compo-
sition of the student bodies of their private schools. Of those which 
have shown an interest, some have prohibited racial discrimination 
while others have enforced it. The latter efforts fall into two 
categories: Some laws forbid the operation of integrated private 
schools; others withhold from integrated schools benefits, ranging 
from tax exemption to free lunches, which are provided to segre-
gated private schools. Both devices are plainly unconstitutional, 
and since both are achieved by the clearest kind of state partici-
pation, they raise no doctrinal difficulties with respect to current 
interpretation of the state action limitation.a6 Nonetheless, they 
deserve our consideration here, for their analysis will help illumi-
nate the state action question when it arises in closely related situ-
ations. 
If we limit our inquiry to the personal interests involved in a 
state's prohibition of integrated private schools, the balance is lop-
sidedly in favor of those who would integrate. The interest of the 
would-be students is the same as the interest of students in educa-
55. See the discussion of local responsibility in pt. m Stlpra, dealing with freedom 
from brutality. 
56. For a survey of the problems in adapting state action doctrine to private education, 
see MILLER, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND PRIVATE EDUCATION (1957). 
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tion generally-to exercise a personal choice to participate in a 
particular kind of institution, both as an end in itself and as a means 
to professional advancement. Furthermore, by hypothesis we are 
here concerned with institutions which would choose not to dis-
criminate if there were no state compulsion; thus we add to the 
students' interest in free choice the same interest on the part of the 
management of the restricted schools. The case is at least as easy 
as that in Shelley v. Kraemer,~7 for it involves willing "sellers" as 
well as "buyers" of integrated education, with the state interceding 
to frustrate them both. 
Against these interests there is arrayed the state's legislative 
policy to preserve segregation, either for fear of the consequences 
which may accrue to white students who are "exposed" to Negroes 
or for fear of the advantages which Negroes may attain through 
attending mixed schools. It merits restatement, however, that this 
policy is not needed to safeguard the individual legislators as pri-
vate citizens, and that it does not express any personal interest. The 
legislature is not forced into distasteful associations because private 
schools choose to admit students without regard to their race. 
The legislature is, of course, representative; in this context, pre-
sumably it represents those who are hostile to school integration. 
But whose hostility is relevant? Not that of the managers or own-
ers of the schools, for they are coerced, by definition. Is it then the 
hostility of students who wish to attend segregated private schools? 
If so, the answer is that they are free to do so, even though some 
schools choose not to discriminate. The hostility which remains 
is that of the "public" -that is, others who are neither potential 
students nor the operators of schools. Unquestionably, these out-
siders should be free to withhold their support from integrated 
private schools, and to express their feeling that integration is 
wrong. But there are limits on the legitimacy of their efforts to 
structure society to their liking, and one of those limits is that they 
may not prevent others from seeking to do the same thing. The 
parallel to the voting cases is striking: while one may seek political 
support for a program, he may not advance his program by inter-
fering with the right of others to use the same poli~cal process to 
oppose him. Those who would achieve a segregated structure for 
society have no legitimate interest in shutting off the rights of 
others to associate freely for the opposite purpose. 
57. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). See also Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915). 
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By hypothesis, the impact of state legislative action on racial 
equality in private education is more serious than the impact of 
leaving the decision to the operators of the schools, since the state's 
coercion is directed only at schools which othenvise would adopt 
a nondiscriminatory policy. Combined with the relative weights 
to be assigned to the competing personal interests, this increased 
impact makes the constitutional balance even more one-sided. But 
there remain the issues of federalism, i.e., the institutional values of 
local responsibility and local prerogative. 
The imposition of a national judicial standard of equal protec-
tion raises questions of federalism as surely as does the exercise of 
congressional power to advance racial equality. But the local re-
sponsibility issue is hardly an issue at all; when the state positively 
enforces racial discrimination, it cannot be said to fulfill its respon~ 
sibility for administering the national policy of racial equality. 
Thus, if the value of decentralization is to carry any weight in this 
balance, it must not be the decentralization of administration of a 
national policy, but the decentralization of decisional power-a 
local prerogative to choose governmental objectives. 
The Supreme Court has, in the public school segregation cases, 
done much of our work for us. Local prerogative to set policy must 
be related to a "proper governmental objective,"fis and the asserted 
justifications for segregation in public schools-avoidance of racial 
tensions, reduced educational efficiency owing to inferior prepara~ 
tion of Negro pupils, and the like-have been overbalanced by the 
impact of segregation on Negro education. It should be obvious 
that in the private school context, where attendance at an integrated 
school is not compelled but chosen, and where improperly prepared 
pupils need not be accepted, the fears which assertedly justified 
public school segregation should be much reduced. On the other 
hand, as we shall see presently, the impact of private school segre-
gation on Negroes seeking education is also minor when compared 
with the impact of public school segregation. The solution to the 
issue of local prerogative must then rest on the associational inter~ 
ests which arguably justify the exercise of local power. As we have 
seen, these interests are all on the side of the schools and students 
who choose to integrate. The interest in local prerogative fails, as 
did the interest in local responsibility, to turn the constitutional 
balance in favor of state laws promoting private school segregation. 
58. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). 
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A state's prohibition against integration of private schools is 
thus clearly invalid.~9 But what of a program merely to give free 
milk to private schools, provided that they are segregated? The 
impact on Negro interests is very much reduced, but the program 
is nonetheless unconstitutional. It is as true of a free milk program 
as it is of the operation of a public school that a distinction based 
on race must be justified by a showing of a proper governmental 
purpose related to race. There is no such legitimate purpose in 
a discriminatory free milk program. Paraphrasing the original 
school segregation decision, we may say that "such [aid] ... where 
the state has undertaken to provide it is a right which must be made 
available to all [private schools] on equal terms . ..so 
Whether the state's enforcement of private school segregation 
takes the form of direct prohibition or discriminatory aid, the in-
validity of the enforcement rests on an analysis which is the same 
as the one we have used to identify the values represented by the 
state action limitation. The parallel dramatizes what we have set 
out to show-that the state action question can be answered best 
when it is asked as a part of a broader examination of the competing 
constitutional interests. 
When we turn to the cases in which the orthodox analysis raises 
the state action issue-the cases in which there is no state enforce-
ment of discrimination, but where private school operators decide 
to exclude Negroes-the interests are not aligned in the same man-
ner. Here the interests of the owners or operators of the schools 
are opposed to those of the Negro applicants. Consider these two 
institutions: 
Case 13: Pilsbury Academy is a little-known week-end military 
school for teenagers. The school stands on land owned by the state 
and leased at a nominal rental. Forty per cent of the building costs 
were contributed by the state, and all of the property is tax exempt. 
Transportation, meals, and uniforms for the students are provided 
by the state. The other sixty per cent of the building costs were 
paid for by four retired colonels who operate the academy and who 
limit admission to white Protestants only. Operating expenses are 
59. The dictum of a Tennessee court is clearly in error. State ex rel. Sloan v. High-
lander Folk School, 5 RAcE REL. L. REP. 91, 92 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. March 7, 1960). 
60. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). See also Missouri ex rel. 
Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 349 (1938). The real problem is not to find conduct 
which is impermissible, but to find a plaintiff who has standing to seek an injunction against 
discriminatory assistance to segregated private schools. 
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met from fees, alumni gifts, and institutional grants. Pilsbury 
Academy is but one of four similar nonprofit military schools serv-
ing the same metropolitan community and it is the only one which 
excludes Negroes. 
Case 14: Zenith Medical College is a nonprofit institution 
financed wholly from private capital, tuition, alumni gifts, and in-
stitutional grants. Members of its Board of Governors are salaried 
and have not personally contributed any capital to the college. 
Zenith is the only medical school within a sao-mile radius. It en-
joys a reputation for high professional competence. Its Board limits 
admission to white Protestants only. 
Fourteenth amendment decisions suggest that the Pilsbury 
Academy is violating the equal protection clause, but that Zenith 
Medical College is not. Do these results accurately reflect a rea-
soned application of the purposes of the state action limitations? 
A. Interests of the Parties 
The interest of colored children in attending Pilsbury Academy 
is slight next to that of colored students in entering Zenith College. 
With respect to the former, since little professional advancement 
is likely to result from obtaining a certificate of attendance, the 
interest is largely one in freedom to associate to pursue an avoca-
tiona! interest in military discipline and to enjoy the unremarkable 
status that comes with being a Pilsbury alumnus. With respect to 
admission to Zenith, the interest involves fundamental desires for 
intellectual self-fulfillment and the acquisition of means to satisfy 
basic aspirations in professional accomplishment, earnings, hous-
ing, and social status. 
The proprietary and nonassociational freedoms of the mana-
gers, donors, teachers, and students at the two institutions are nearly 
the same. It may even be that the interests of the teachers and 
students are not affected by the policy at either institution; they 
did not participate in the decision to exclude Negroes, and a differ-
ent policy may not offend them. With respect to the donors, the 
interests are largely proprietary, i.e., concerned with their freedom 
to dispose of their own earnings according to their own conscience, 
since they are not brought into personal contact with the students. 
With respect to management, both the Pilsbury colonels and the 
Zenith Board of Governors have nonassociational interests at stake, 
but the colonels also have a proprietary interest since they person-
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ally contributed a substantial part of the school property-a claim 
the Zenith Board cannot duplicate. 
In both cases it is clear that there are some legitimate claims 
opposed to the minority interest in access. At this level of inquiry, 
it does not follow that the presence of some state assistance to the 
Pilsbury Academy should distinguish it within the state action 
analysis. Indeed, since the interest of the adversely affected Negro 
students in Zenith College is so much greater than the interest of 
Negro children in attending Pilsbury Academy, the need for equal 
protection safeguards more strongly favors applying the fourteenth 
amendment to Zenith than to Pilsbury; at least the absence of obvi-
ous state connections ought not automatically insulate the Zenith 
Board from constitutional demands for equal protection. 
B. Impact of the Decisions to Discriminate 
Looking again to the descriptions of Pilsbury and Zenith, it be-
comes quite clear that the impact of the discriminatory decisions 
on the minority interests is only casually related to formal state 
connections. We may agree that the action of the state was a neces-
sary condition to the success and existence of the Pilsbury Academy, 
since it provided land, capital, and tax exemptions; but the same 
proposition can be applied to Zenith College, so that the impact 
of the decisions to discriminate turns on other considerations. 
Zenith Medical College receives local police and fire protection. 
As an educational institution, it is exempt from ta.."'m.tion and its 
donors may take their contributions as income tax deductions. It 
is served by municipal sanitation, power and light agencies and, 
although it pays for these services, still the continued ability and 
willingness of the state to sell are necessary conditions of Zenith's 
operation. Similarly, state accreditation of the school is necessary 
for its graduates to qualify for state medical examinations and to 
participate as interns or residents in state clinics and hospitals. If 
all these connections were withdrawn unless Zenith revised its ad-
missions policy, it is unlikely that Zenith could continue to exclude 
Negroes. Thus, discrimination could hardly take place without 
state assistance at either Pilsbury or Zenith. We do not suggest, 
however, that satisfaction of a "but for" test settles the question of 
state action, or even exhausts the impact inquiry, although in other 
contexts the courts have occasionally spoken as though it did.61 If 
61. Sec text accompanying notes 14-20 stipra. 
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such a test were adopted, there would be scarcely an area of activity 
in which a privately made decision to discriminate could be sus-
tained.62 
More significant than the fact that discrimination could not be 
accomplished if the state withdrew its support are the consequences 
which flow from the discrimination; here the impact is clearly 
more serious with respect to Zenith than with respect to Pilsbury. 
Exclusion from Zenith College means-for all but the wealthiest 
or most talented Negro students-exclusion from the medical pro-
fession, there being no other medical school within 500 miles. Ex-
clusion from the Pilsbury Academy can be little more than an 
annoyance by itself, since three similar schools operate on a non-
discriminatory basis within the same community and, as already 
suggested, access to Pilsbury is not related to any especially critical 
interest. 
C. Local Responsibility 
We have suggested that Pilsbury Academy violates the equal 
protection clause as presently interpreted. This estimate would be 
unquestionable if the reviewing court were to conclude that the 
state had set up the "private" arrangement as a means of avoiding 
its own obligation to provide facilities of this kind only on a non-
discriminatory basis. The attempted leasing of the buildings of 
Little Rock's Central High School to a private corporation which 
would operate a segregated school was a constitutional failure.63 
In another connection, the Supreme Court warned the same school 
board that "State support of segregated schools through any ar-
rangement, management, funds, or property cannot be squared 
with the Amendment's command .... "64 
Even if no such conclusion could be drawn with respect to the 
origins of the state's aid to Pilsbury Academy, present formulations 
of state action would surely include this case. The discussion to this 
point suggests also that considerations beyond a mechanical view 
62. If fire and police protection and all municipal services were to be withdrawn from 
homeowners who declined to admit Negroes into their homes because of race, the privatdy 
made discriminatory decision would not long endure. Yet the fact that "but for" these 
state connections the homeowner would be unable to discriminate has never persuaded the 
courts that the fourteenth amendment applies, nor should it. See Hackley v. Art Builders, 
Inc., 179 F. Supp. 851 (D. Md. 1960). 
63. Aaron v. Cooper, 261 F.2d 97 (8th Cir. 1958). 
64. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 19 (1958). For evidence of increasing judicial im-
patience with resistance and evasion by the states, see the history of Bush v. Orleans Parish 
School Bd., in 6 RAcE REL. L. REP. 74 (1961); 5 id. at 655-69, 1000-27 (1960). 
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of state action make it at least as imperative to extend the guar-
antees of equal protection against Zenith as against Pilsbury. It 
may be objected that such a limitation on Zenith may be self-de-
feating since it might result in the abandonment of the school by 
its supporters; that would surely be a more serious loss to the com-
munity than the loss of Pilsbury Academy for similar reasons. One 
hesitates to predict such a withdrawal of support, but even assum-
ing that it were to take place, some good consequences would ac-
company the bad. The closing of Zenith would help to end the 
disparity between the races which the Zenith policy had encour-
aged. Furthermore, Zenith's closing would probably result in local 
pressure to establish a public medical school which would meet the 
community's needs, as well as the demands of the equal protection 
clause. 
It is in this third dimension-that of local responsibility-that 
the atypical character of our hypothetical schools becomes clear. 
For although only a few states have prohibited discrimination in 
private schools, nearly all the states have established equivalent 
public institutions which must, under any current view of the four-
teenth amendment, be open to all qualified students. In providing 
such schools, the states do fulfill part of their responsibility to afford 
educational opportunities to satisfy the interest of Negroes in edu-
cation-perhaps more effectively than were they to abandon public 
education and enact a law prohibiting discrimination in private 
schools. Thus the net effect of private school discrimination is or-
dinarily not to cut off access to quality education, but is largely 
confined to a vestigial reinforcement of segregation, with some 
accompanying sense of inferiority and loss of status by the deprived 
minority. In acknowledging the offsetting interests of the proprie-
tors and contributors in the operation of their schools, it may be 
concluded that the courts are not warranted in expanding the equal 
protection clause wholesale to cover all educational institutions, 
where the impact of discrimination has been lessened through the 
establishment of unsegregated public schools. 
Nonetheless, whether or not the states are to be fastened with a 
"duty" to establish professional colleges or other schools-a propo-
sition the Court has thus far avoided for good and obvious rea-
sons-the failure of a state to establish adequate public institutions, 
free of racial restrictions, would provide additional justification for 
imposing equal protection limitations on colleges such as Zenith. 
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This is a conclusion which the Supreme Court might reach, but 
which it could reach only with the greatest difficulty, using the 
language which provides today's gloss of state action. 
VI. EMPLOYMENT 
Employment discrimination, like discrimination in voting, edu-
cation, or housing, may affect vital personal interests in living 
standards, in intellectual satisfactions, and in a sense of professional 
accomplishment. Without access to the professions, the incentive 
to take advantage of newly won access to educational institutions 
is weakened.65 Equally important in our status-conscious society 
may be the loss of the social acceptability and community influence 
which accompany a good job. 
The characterization of a case as one concerning employment 
discrimination, however, is no guarantee that the particular interest 
at stake is a fundamental one, so that constitutional protections are 
more likely to apply. The contexts in which racial discrimination 
occurs will vary the extent of the impact on Negro interests, as 
well as the weight to be given the interests themselves. Similarly, 
competing interests will differ in their strength from case to case. 
These differences explain many of the results in state action cases, 
but they do not correspond with the formulas for state action which 
are now standard. 
Consider the following cases, neither of which-under a doc-
trinaire view of state action-violates the guarantee of equal pro-
tection: 
Case 15: An independent gas station owner fires his only Negro 
employee and establishes a firm policy of not hiring any Negroes. 
(This was our Case 3.66) 
Case 16: A large automobile manufacturer in Flint, Michigan, 
fires sixty-five Negroes on its professional staff and establishes a 
firm policy of not hiring Negroes for professional positions. 
Case 15 involves, for the Negro employee, a loss which is largely 
economic; he has not lost any significant status, nor any special 
job satisfactions. The impact of the owner's action may be rather 
limited even as to this one man, depending upon the availability 
of other jobs at the same low skill level within the community. 
65. See 1 CIVIL RIGHTs CoMM'N REP. 275 (1959) (views of Dr. John H. Fischer, 
Superintendent of Schools of Baltimore, Md.). 
66. P. 6 supra. 
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Case 15 is also obviously different from Case r6 in the degree of 
involvement of the employer's constitutionally legitimate interests. 
In addition to his proprietary interest-to dispose of property he 
has earned according to his own desires-there is a personal in· 
terest in his freedom to choose his associates (presumably the policy· 
makers in Case r6 have slight occasion to mingle with their em· 
ployees). Moreover, the employer's interest in Case 15 may involve 
his own economic freedom, should it appear that retention of the 
colored employee may result in a boycott of his station by white 
customers. And finally, the availability of alternative local reme· 
dies is relevant; the application of federal constitutional guarantees 
may be inappropriate just because it will discourage a sense of com· 
munity responsibility. Without unraveling the case completely, it 
is fairly clear that there is little justification for applying the four. 
teenth amendment to the facts of Case 15 in this limited context. 
What if the gas station owner had previously paid the employee 
a month's advance wages, and the discharged employee were to 
refuse to return the money, forcing the employer to sue to get his 
money back? Does Shelley v. Kraemer61 mean that the state court 
cannot lend its power to help the employer because there would 
have been no dispute had the employee not been fired for racial 
reasons? Such a mechanical test for state action, although sup· 
ported by Mr. Justice Douglas in Black v. Cutter Labs.,68 seems 
wholly unjustified; it discards the purposes of the state action limi· 
tation in favor of a formula which makes the availability of consti· 
tutional guarantees turn on accidents of procedure. A proper appli· 
cation of the state action limitation to cases of this kind must instead 
rest on the considerations of impact and justification discussed 
above. Since the constitutional balance favored the employer's ex--
ercise of choice to discharge the Negro (and assuming that an 
employee would have no right to retain advance payment after 
discharge in the absence of a special contract provision), there 
should be no constitutional obstacle to the employer's court action. 
But suppose that every independently owned gas station in a 
large city should discharge its Negro employees. The impact on 
Negro employment in the community would not differ substan· 
tially from the impact of the decision made by the large manu· 
67. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). For a discussion of the Shelley case, see text accompanying 
notes 84-104 infra. 
68. 351 U.S. 292, 302-03 (1956) (dissenting opinion). 
STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14: Page 3 
facturer in Case r6, but the state action limitation need not be 
applied in just the same manner. Each small proprietor has his own 
interest in choosing his associates; the multiplication of effect on 
Negro employment is arguably matched by the multiplication of 
personal freedom justification on the side of the proprietors. The 
assumption, of course, is that the proprietors are so motivated. If 
some form of "conscious parallelism" were shown, so that the own-
ers might be found to be responding less to their own associational 
choices than to fear of a boycott by white customers, then the ar-
gument based on associational freedoms is lost.69 The economic 
justification argument of a large number of small employers acting 
in concert does not differ significantly from that of a large em-
ployer. 
What would be different if the discharges resulted not from the 
owners' decision, but from a state law which forbade the employ-
ment of Negroes in gas stations? The impact on Negro employ-
ment is not substantially greater than it would be if each owner 
were to decide against hiring Negroes. But since the decision to 
discriminate comes from the legislature rather than from each gas 
station owner, both the employees' and the employers' interests-
69. The distinction between economic and associational interests has evidently been 
persuasive to the federal courts in the labor union cases. While a Negro cannot compel a 
union to admit him to membership, Oliphant v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 156 
F. Supp. 89 (N.D. Ohio), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 893 (1957), affd, 262 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 
1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 935 (1959), he can compel the union to refrain from dis-
criminating against him in its collective bargaining, Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 
192 (1944). But the associational interest in union membership in the 1960's is of dubious 
weight, in view of the typical union's shift away from social activities and toward purely 
economic functions. When the union controls access to employment for workers with 
various skills, it begins to resemble the combination of all the employers in a community. 
Nonetheless, the conclusion that constitutional guarantees should be applied across the 
board to unions is unwarranted, at least where statutory protections are available, as Pro-
fessor Wellington has ably demonstrated. Wellington, The Constitution, the Labor Union, 
and "Governmental Action", 70 YALE L.J. 345 (1961). The principal danger to be avoided 
is the overloading of the judiciary with a cumbersome body of technical rules of labor law 
which become embedded in the Constitution. The legislative process may be more appro-
priate for fashioning and refashioning most rules of this kind. Ibid. The same sort of 
institutional argument may be directed at suggestions for constitutional protection against 
corporate power. See, e.g., Freund, The "Charles Evans Hughes" Lecture, 19 N.Y. CouNTY 
LAw. Ass'N B. BULL. 12, 14 (1961). But surely the courts need not create an entire "corpus 
of constitutional law to deal with the most subtle and complex and varied issues of labor law 
and corporate law," ibid., just because they extend some constitutional protection against 
some quasi-private action. If a court were to grant relief against discharges of the kind 
noted in our Case 16, for e.xample, the demands on their lawmaking capacity would be 
modest, and the form of relief traditional. 
We are here concerned primarily with constitutional guarantees of racial equality. If 
we may assume congressional hostility to civil rights legislation, it is unlikely that statutory 
protections for such interests will be forthcoming, desirable as they may be. It is not a 
novel proposition to suggest that the Supreme Court may be ·willing to advance various 
civil rights interests because the other branches of the federal government have failed 
to do so. 
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proprietary, associational, and economic-are denied. Since em, 
ployers cannot hire whom they please, and Negro employees have 
lost their opportunity to work, both are in the adversely affected 
class.70 
The use of the legislative power to restrict these interests in 
behalf of remote third parties who may be fearful of their free 
exercise is an intolerable limitation on personal freedoms; the legig, 
lative choice embraces values which are not constitutionally legiti, 
mate, and it operates with an impact that is clearly excessive. The 
same would be true even though the law were to require only the 
segregation of Negro gas station employees rather than their total 
e.'{clusion. Although the impact on racial equality is lessened, there 
is still no redeeming value in the desire of third persons who, 
from racial antagonism, wish to affect the employment relationship 
without regard to the wishes of the employer or his employees. 
If the case did not involve a state law, but did involve public 
assistance to the employer who discharged his employee for racial 
reasons, how would the situation be altered? Here the employer's 
"freedoms" must again be treated as adverse to those of the Negro 
employee, since the discriminatory decision is made by him. But 
the legitimacy of the employer's claims is much reduced: to the 
extent that the station has been supplied by others, as where the 
operator has leased the station from the state, or the state has in, 
sured a bank loan enabling him to operate, there is less legitimacy 
in his claim that he should be able to dispose of what is "his own" 
according to his own desires. The proprietary interest and some 
of the economic interests are partly those of the state, the bank, and 
the state insuring agency. The employer's interests are thus limited 
to associational and lesser economic claims. To the extent the state 
is involved it has no personal interest of nonassociation which jus, 
tifies its discouraging Negro employment or permitting its assets 
to be used for such a purpose. 
May the state assert a legitimate economic interest by claiming 
that a boycott of the gas station may jeopardize the economic stake 
it holds in the gas station for the taxpayers of the state? Not seri, 
ously, for any increased costs to the state are spread over the whole 
community; only a slight invasion of the economic interest of any 
70. In Shelley v. Kraemer, the Court's opinion emphasized the fact that both the 
buyer and the seller of the land in question were willing to proceed with the sale. 334 
U.S. I, 19 (1948). See also Trua.x v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915). 
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individual citizen can result from the application of constitutional 
guarantees of racial equality in the state's employment practices. 
Case 15 is thus a closer one; if the fourteenth amendment does not 
apply to protect the Negro, the reason is that there is still something 
to be said for the employer's claims, and that the impact of the 
discriminatory decision on the claims of the affected employee is 
not overwhelming. 
If the employer is an absentee owner of the station and does not 
work with his employees, there is much less legitimacy to a claimed 
interest in nonassociation. Since aid from the state also reduces his 
proprietary and economic interests, the constitutional balance may 
shift in favor of protecting the Negro from the impact of the dis-
criminatory decision, unless there are local remedies available 
which ought not be discouraged by federal intervention. 
In Case r6, we have already noted that the policymakers of the 
large corporation which refused to tolerate Negroes in professional 
jobs cannot defend the decision by their own interest in nonassa. 
dation, since they scarcely have occasion to mingle with their em-
ployees. Furthermore, the company's economic interests-to pre-
vent loss of business from a boycott, or a loss of labor supply from 
white employees who will not work with Negroes-while legiti-
mate, are not likely to be seriously affected. Imposing an equal 
protection standard on the company should have little impact on 
its sales or labor supply, for two reasons. The first goes to the com-
pany's dominant position in the community. Second, the same 
constitutional standard will no doubt be applied to the company's 
oligopolistic competitors. Moreover, the company policymakers 
themselves have at best a diluted proprietary interest in selecting 
employees on bases unrelated to job qualification, since the property 
they manage is probably not substantially their "own." 
On the other side, the impact of the discriminatory decision on 
the legitimate interests of the adversely affected class in subsist-
ence, a sense of professional accomplishment, and status may be 
very great, especially if comparable opportunities are not available 
within the community. Since the 1946 decision of Marsh v. Ala-
bama,11 the Supreme Court has expertly avoided any elaboration 
of its equation of a company town's restrictions on vital personal 
interests to restrictions imposed by a state.72 As Professor Manning 
71. 326 u.s. 501 (1946). 
72. E.g., Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), 
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has shown, the issue in a given case must be narrowed by reference 
to the power specifically exercised and the particular interests in-
vaded by its exercise.73 Further, the issue must be narrowed again 
by a particularized consideration of the justification, if any, for the 
exercise of power.74 For a generation which has been educated in 
a climate more favorable to claims of job security than to claims of 
liberty of contract, however, it does no violence to an enlightened 
state action concept to apply the equal protection clause to Case 16: 
the minority interests are important ones, the discriminatory deci-
sion involves an exercise of power affecting these interests nearly 
as seriously as a legislative decision, the legitimate management 
interests in its prerogative to make such a decision seem slight, and 
the effect on those interests which result from forbidding such a 
use of power is modest. 
We have not yet dealt with the interests in promoting local re-
sponsibility in the employment context, but it should be acknowl-
edged that there has already been a significant development of local 
responsibility in this field.76 The adoption of state fair employment 
practice laws and their effective enforcement may justify the with-
holding of federal-law sanctions, statutory or constitutional, in 
cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950); Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y v. Metropolitan Life 
Ins. Co., 297 N.Y. 339, 79 N.E2d 433, cert. denied, 335 U.S. 886 (1948). 
73. Manning, Corporate Potl!er and Individual Freedom: Some General Analysis and 
Partimlar Reservations, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 38, 44-46 (1960). 
74. Suppose, for c.xample, that the freedom to distribute literature is denied, not by 
the managers of a company town, but by the private owners of a large apartment project. 
In just such a case the New York Court of Appeals held that a refusal by the owners to 
permit the plaintiffs to hand out their literature in the corridors of the apartment houses 
V.':IS not the equivalent of action by the state. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., 297 N.Y. 339, 79 N.E.2d 433, cert. denied, 335 U.S. 886 (1948). 
The court's distinction of Marsh v. Alabama seemed frivolous on the face of things: the 
case at hand involved distribution in the building corridors, while Marsh involved distri-
bution on the company town sidewalks. That does not, somehow, seem to dispose of the 
issue of state action-at least not as that limitation is usually conceived. But if we examine 
the impact of the restriction, and its justification, we may not unreasonably conclude that 
the court came to the right conclusion. 
In the Watchtotl!er case the New York court permitted the apartment owners to give 
protection to their tenants' interests in privacy, just as we suggest that an employer might 
properly consider his employees' associational preferences. That the interest in privacy is 
not without weight was made official just a few years later, when the Supreme Court sus-
tained a "Green River" ordinance which forbade door-to-door solicitation by salesmen who 
lacked invitations from the householders on whom they called. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 
U.S. 622 (1951). The New York court used the language of state action to achieve a sound 
balance of competing claims of a constitutional dimension. The size of the housing project, 
while relevant, was not controlling. 
75. Some twenty states and a number of cities have established commissions to deal 
with racial discrimination in employment, and some of these are also given powers over 
other forms of racial discrimination. See generally Note, The Right to Equal Treatment: 
Administrative Enforcement of Antidiscrimination Legislation, 74 HARv. L. REv. 526 
{1961). 
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those states which have them. The value of settling such problems 
at the community level is hard to overstate, mainly because such 
solutions tend to extend their beneficial effects beyond the indi-
vidual cases which may come before a court or administrative body 
for decision. The experience with school desegregation76 and vot-
ing, 77 in contrast, indicates that racial equality forced from outside 
(and the federal court may seem to be outside even though it sits 
across the street from the state court) tends to be limited in its effect 
to the case at hand. A useful comparison in the South may be found 
in the voluntary, locally arranged desegregation of dime store 
lunch counters. 
The principle of local responsibility has weighed most heavily 
in the few cases which have equated state inaction with state ac-
tion.78 These decisions suggest that the fourteenth amendment im-
poses an affirmative duty on the states to guarantee equal protec-
tion, and that a state's failure to discharge its duty enables Congress 
to legislate pursuant to section 5 of the amendment to provide 
remedies against the private offenders. Professor Hale, the first to 
examine this formula at length, would have limited it to situations 
in which the state has withdrawn previously existing local reme-
dies, as in the repeal of an antilynch law or the repeal of a common-
law innkeeper's duty.79 Since less than half the states have adopted 
fair employment practice legislation, this view of local responsi-
bility would be of limited help in the employment .field. Moreover, 
a constitutional guarantee which depends on the historical accident 
of previously existing local remedies does not truly reflect a local 
responsibility principle. 
76. The first five years after the Brown decision saw virtually no progress in school 
desegregation in the Deep South. In May 1959, not a single school district had been de-
segregated in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, or South Carolina. Token 
integration (in a handful of school districts) had taken place in Arkansas, North Carolina, 
Tennessee, and Virginia, and has since taken place in Florida, Georgia, and Louisiana. 
Throughout the South, only twenty-six school districts had been desegregated by court 
order. See 1 CIVIL RIGHTS CoJ>.IM'N REP. 296 (1959); 2 id. at 39 (1961). 
77. Thus, despite such decisions as Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 {S.D. Ala.), 
affd mem., 336 U.S. 933 (1949) (Alabama constitutional requirement that prospective 
voter be able to "understand and explain" any clause of the United States Constitution to 
the satisfaction of local registrars held invalid), the "literacy" test remains the most widely 
used device for denying Negroes the right to register to vote on the basis of their race. 
Four persons were registered at the conclusion of the two-year litigation in United States 
v. Raines, 172 F. Supp. 552 (M.D. Ga. 1959), rev'd, 362 U.S. 17 (1960); United States v. 
Raines, 189 F. Supp. 121, 134-35 (M.D. Ga. 1960). See generally Comment, judicial 
Protection of Minority Voting Rights: The Case for Constitutional Reform, 22 Omo ST. 
L.J. 390,398, 412-18 (1961). 
78. See cases cited note 30 supra; cf. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953). 
79. See note 124 infra. 
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Others, particularly Frank and Munro, have been bolder in sug-
gesting that with respect to certain interests such as the right to own 
or use land or the right of access to places of public accommodation, 
state inaction in the face of privately made discriminatory decisions 
will support federal remedies whether or not the state had aban-
doned previously available remedies.80 
At least one case goes further than either of these, suggesting 
that the states have an affirmative duty to enforce equal protection 
generally, and that acts of private citizens which interfere with this 
duty are enjoinable in the federal courts.81 The significance of this 
suggestion has not gone unremarked: 
If the rationale of [the H oxic case J ••• extends to private action which 
is not directed specifically at state officials and which interferes only with 
a state's performance of its general duty to ensure to its citizens the guar-
antees of the fourteenth amendment, it would seem to undermine the 
principle that the prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment do not apply 
to private action.82 
Our position here, however, is simply to acknowledge that the 
failure of the community to protect its citizens from severe abridg-
ments of fundamental interests is one more consideration the fed-
eral courts are entided to review in determining whether they can 
provide relief from these private abridgments. The consideration 
is relevant whether the relief sought is provided by federal laws 
which proceed from the fourteenth amendment, or whether it is 
based on the implications of the unexecuted amendment itself. As 
but one consideration, it should neither be converted to doctrine nor 
made absolute. Such an absolute would make no more sense than 
an extension of Marsh v. Alabama to the proposition that pri-
vate ownership of property is literally irrelevant in determining 
whether the fourteenth amendment has been offended, or a read-
ing of Shelley v. Kraemer for the proposition that wherever a state 
court or policeman helps to make effective a private decision to 
discriminate, equal protection has been denied. 
Thus the failure of a state to legislate against the small gas sta-
80. Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws", 
50 CoLtnr. L. REv. 131 (1950). Thus, according to their interpretation of the equal pro-
tection clause, ''It was generally understood that Congress could legislate to secure these 
ends, without regard to whether the particular objective was frustrated by state action or 
state inaction." !d. at 168. An interest in employment, however, is not in their list of 
interests to which this theory applies. 
81. Brewer v. Hoxie School Dist., 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956). 
82. 70 HARv. L. REv. 1299, 1300 (1957); see note 30 supra. 
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tion owner in Case 15 should not, by itself, support the application 
of a federal injunction. By the same token, however, failure of the 
state in Case 16 to protect persons from the serious abuse of power 
reflected in the corporation's discriminatory policy might make 
the difference in view of the other elements in the case. A selective 
application of the state action limitation can thus be used as a stimu-
lus to local responsibility rather than as a screen to hide local 
failures of responsibility. 
VII. Housrnd3 
The decision in Shelley v. Kraemer84 seems irresistibly correct. 
But since the opinion raises more questions than it answers, at-
tempts to rationalize the Shelley case within traditional state action 
formulas tend to fail. When Mr. Chief Justice Vinson said that 
"[racially] restrictive agreements standing alone cannot be re-
garded as violative of any rights guaranteed ... by the Fourteenth 
Amendment,"85 he provoked some highly quotable avowals of dis-
content: 
What is the principle involved? ... May not the state employ its law 
to vindicate the privacy of property against a trespasser, regardless of 
the grounds of his exclusion, or does it embrace the owner's reasons for 
excluding if it buttresses his power by the law? Would a declaratory 
judgment that a fee is determinable if a racially restrictive limitation 
should be violated represent discrimination by the state upon the racial 
ground? Would a judgment of ejectment?86 
The editorial response to these two expressions has centered around 
an attempt to discover or invent the kind of state connection which 
will satisfy the state action requirement. It is suggested, for ex-
ample, that the state acts in the sense of the amendment when it 
coerces private discrimination, but not when it simply lends its aid 
to such racial discrimination as private individuals may choose to 
practice, as by furnishing a policeman to escort an unwanted guest 
83. Hotels, motels, and other forms of transient housing are more appropriately con-
sidered in the section on public accommodations, pt. VIII infra. 
84. 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding unconstitutional the enforcement by two state courts 
of restrictive covenants limiting the occupancy of real estate to Caucasians). 
85. Id. at 13. That Mr. Chief Justice Vinson meant what he said is attested to by his 
dissent from the Court's disposition of Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), in which 
the Shelley rule was broadened to cover a judicial award of damages against a seller for 
breach of a racially restrictive covenant. 
86. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REV. 
1, 29-30 (1959). 
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from a private home.87 This analysis is undeniably supported by 
the just-quoted language of the Shelley opinion, and it does give 
some recognition to the personal interests involved,88 but it per-
petuates the untenable distinction between the state action requir-
ment on the one hand and the balance of "substantive" constitu-
tional interests on the other. This way of looking at the problem, it 
seems to us, is even more dangerous than the suggestion's other un-
fortunate aspect: its assumption that every private discrimination 
is invalid once the right formal state connection has been found. 
To avoid these pitfalls, an alternative suggestion has been made 
that Shelley may be read as an example of state assistance to a 
private exercise of "powers that are peculiarly akin to sovereign 
powers,"89 by way of analogy to Marsh v. Alabama90 and Terry v. 
Adams.fll The idea is that the state's ordering of private affairs runs 
all the way from its "neutral" enforcement of private decisions to 
discriminate-as where a homeowner refuses to allow Negroes to 
visit him-to its establishment, by common-law rule, legislation, 
or executive directive, of rules which do not depend on any exercise 
of private choice for their application-as, presumably, where Ne-
groes are forbidden by law to live in certain areas.92 The latter type 
of ordering, it is said, satisfies the state action requirement. 
Such a suggestion has merit in that it abandons, at least for pur-
poses of analyzing judicial action, the separation between the state 
action inquiry and the inquiry into the substantive claim of denial 
of a constitutional right. But it unhappily attaches importance to 
the notion that the individual homeowner who ejects a Negro, 
without the aid of a court or a policeman, is not exercising "sov-
ereign" power, but some other kind of power. Of course the owner 
has the power (in a legal sense) to eject an unwanted person, only 
because he is the "owner"-because the law recognizes certain pow-
87. Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wedts-
ler, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 13-16 (1959). Professor Pollak is careful to limit the scope of 
his "test": "'Vhat is offered is tentative, a beginning point, premised on the avowed value 
judgment that in 1959 it is consistent with the democratic theory embodied in the four-
teenth amendment to [permit such privately chosen, uncoerced racial discrimination] 
•••• " Id. at 17. 
88. As did the Court's reference in the Shelley opinion to the state's coercion of will-
ing buyers and sellers. 334 U.S. at 19. 
89. Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 CoLUM. L. REv. 1083, 1116 (1960). 
90. 326 u.s. 501 (1946). 
91. 345 u.s. 461 (1953). 
92. Racial zoning was held violative of the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment in Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). 
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ers in him. If the law did not have application to this circumstance, 
then the owner might eject the Negro only if he were big enough. 
The potential application of law is what distinguishes these rela-
tionships from those of a jungle. The state is not neutral in pre-
ferring control over private property ahead of full racial equality 
in this circumstance; rather, it has "structured"93 its legal system 
by making a choice of values. 
That, it seems to us, is the key to Shelley v. Kraemer. The sub-
stitution of a test of "powers . . • akin to sovereign powers" for a 
test of state action is not really an analytical advance. Rather, the 
interests we have described in the foregoing sections of this article 
must be weighed. Such an approach obviously requires the aban-
donment of the Court's statement in Shelley that the restrictive 
covenants were valid "standing alone." Private arrangements 
should be held valid or invalid depending on their functional simi-
larity to public arrangements, not their formal connection to a 
branch of the government. We do not suggest that the state action 
limitation is outmoded, but only that it should be used consciously 
as an instrument of constitutional policy and not as a formula for 
escaping the duty to make policy. 
The interest of the segregated minority in racial equality in 
housing is as basic as the need for shelter itself, for the system of 
restrictive covenants results not merely in segregation but in the 
denial of adequate housing to Negroes.94 Even if segregation into 
racially pure neighborhoods were the only result, the Supreme 
Court has long since rejected the "separate but equal" formula as 
applied to housing.95 But the covenant system in operation does 
not permit equal housing for Negroes; it fences them into a ''Ne-
gro ghetto" which typically falls well below the quality of white 
neighborhoods occupied by persons of comparable means.96 
At the time when the restrictive covenant cases arose, the nation 
faced a serious shortage of housing generally; the availability of 
GI loans and the forced accumulation of earnings during the war 
combined with the wish of many former servicemen to settle down, 
so that there was an unprecedented demand for housing. For the 
first time, Negroes shared significandy in the demand, and for 
93. The reference is to :tv!r. Justice Clark's opinion in Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 
484 (1953). 
94. See I CIVIL RIGHTS Cm.m'N REP. 343-54 (1959). 
95. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). 
96. See generally WEAVER, THE NEGRO GHETIO (1948). 
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them the housing shortage was doubly acute.97 The result was that 
formerly all-white neighborhoods became dotted with Negro fami-
lies; frequendy, real estate operators would panic the remaining 
white residents into selling at sacrifice prices; the property could 
then be sold to Negroes at a fancy profit;98 the system of "block-
busting" was the result.99 The response was the widespread forma-
tion of "improvement" or "protective" associations, designed to 
keep Negroes out of white neighborhoods; the NAACP's brief in 
one of the restrictive covenant cases noted that there were some 150 
of these associations in the Detroit area alone. The favorite tech-
nique of such an association was the circulation of a restrictive cov-
enant for signature by the residents of a neighborhood. As the use 
of the covenants became more popular, the range of choice for Ne-
gro home buyers, or even renters, narrowed. 
When Negroes with the means to buy homes in good neigh-
borhoods are denied access there, they naturally turn to the best 
homes in poorer neighborhoods. They are able to outbid others, 
and those others turn to relatively poorer housing, and so on. The 
result is that virtually all Negro housing sells at a higher price than 
comparable housing for whites, because of the classical operation 
of supply and demand. Restrictive covenants deny to nearly all 
Negro families the kind of housing which they might otherwise 
afford.100 Segregation is thus not the covenants' only consequence, 
although in the North housing segregation is the foundation for 
most other forms of segregation. 
Finally, the restriction of a large portion of the population to a 
relatively small land area necessarily results in crowding. "Doub-
ling up" is a euphemism for the piling of two or more families into 
housing designed for one. Standards of sanitation have to be sacri-
ficed; if building codes are enforced stricdy, a great many people 
will simply be without homes. Disease rates are notoriously higher 
97. See VasE, CAUCASIANs ONLY 56-57 (1959). 
98. See, e.g., id. at llO-ll. A particularly chilling description of the scare tactics of 
some real estate dealers may be found in Hearings Before the United States Commission 
on Civil Rights, Housing, vol. I, at 218-29 (1959). 
99. "Blockbusting" is still typical of the expansion of Negro neighborhoods. See 
1 CIVIL RIGHTS CoMM'N REP. 367, 379-80, 430-33 (1959). 
100. The pattern is described by Judge Edgerton in his dissent from the decision in 
Hurd v. Hodge, 162 F.2d 233, 243-45 (D.C. Cir. 1947). This dissent also rested on the 
legal arguments which were persuasive to the Supreme Court when it reversed the District 
of Columbia Circuit in the companion case to Shelley v. Kraemer. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 
U.S. 24 (1948). Judge Edgerton's opinion expands his earlier views in Mays v. Burgess, 
147 F.2d 869, 873 (D.C. Cir.) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 868 (1945); 
Mays v. Burgess, 152 F.2d 123, 125 (dissenting opinion), enforcing 147 F.2d 869 (D.C. 
Cir. 1945). 
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under such circumstances than for the rest of the population. Crime 
and delinquency similarly rise.101· 
Combined with this staggering impact on Negro interests of a 
personal kind is the interest, shared by seller and buyer, in the free 
alienation of land. When the Court in the Shelley opinion re-
ferred to the willingness of sellers and buyers to make their deal, 
it gave new expression to a common-law tradition at least as old 
as Quia Emptores. This principle seems especially applicable to a 
system which may exclude from eligibility to buy as many as one-
third of the residents of a city. One could hardly find a better occa-
sion for upholding the freedom of contract. 
Against these interests there stood two countervailing consid-
erations on the side of the white neighbors: (a) The threat of fall-
ing property values; (b) the chance that the neighborhood would 
soon become virtually all Negro, coupled with their interest in non-
association. The first threat is only that. Whatever else may be said 
of "blockbusting," ordinarily it does not lower property values; the 
pressure for Negro housing has thus far been enough to keep de-
mand and prices up.102 The second concern may or may not be 
warranted, depending on a great many variable factors.103 But, 
assuming as a fact a potential rapid turnover of a neighborhood 
from all white to all Negro, whether this fact justifies exclusion of 
Negroes on associational grounds is another matter. The associa-
tion of neighbor with neighbor is not a fixed relationship; it varies 
according to the neighbors' choices. In modern urban America, if 
one does not care to associate with his next-door neighbor, he need 
not associate; an interest in being free from the mere sight of one's 
neighbor does not rise to the level of constitutional dignity. Of 
course the interest in nonassociation is legitimate; of course it is 
101. Crowded housing is plainly not the sole cause of slums. See, e.g., THE ExPLOD· 
ING METROPOLIS 115-18 {Fortune Magazine ed. 1958). But Negroes who want to escape 
from such conditions know that crowding is a cause of slum conditions, and an important 
one. A 1945 leaflet of the Chicago branch of the NAACP, seeking support for a campaign 
against restrictive covenants, concluded: "Let's buy freedom from SLUMS!" VOSE, 
CAUCASIANs ONLY 72 (1959). See also Judge Edgerton's opinions cited in note 100 sttpra. 
102. See LAURENT!, PROPERTY VALUES AND RAcE 50-53 (1960). The immediate post-
Shelley situation is described in VasE, CAUCAStANs ONLY 218-23 (1959). 
103. A recent study in Philadelphia shows that while the rate of turnover may be as 
rapid as three years, the rate is highly variable, depending on such factors as the following: 
The availability of reasonable financing terms for Negro borrowing; the general supply of 
housing, particularly for whites to occupy when they move; the activity of real estate oper-
ators; the proportion of rented homes (owned by absentees from the neighborhood) to 
"owned" homes; the proportion of land in commercial use; and even the proximity of 
parochial schools. RAPKIN & GRIGSBY, THE DEMAND FOR HousiNG IN RAciALLY MIXED 
AREAS 116-18 (1960). 
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relevant, and it cannot be ignored. But neither is it an absolute. 
In Shelley v. Kraemer the interest in nonassociation was not ig~ 
nored, but outweighed. 
There remains to be considered the national interest in pr~ 
moting local responsibility and local prerogative. Historically, the 
restrictive covenant served as a substitute for the racial zoning laws 
which became vulnerable to constitutional attack in 1917.104 Far 
from carrying out their responsibility for effectuating the national 
policy of racial equality, localities which made use of racial cove~ 
nants operated at cross purposes.105 The claim of local decision~ 
making prerogative similarly lacks legitimacy when it is asserted 
in behalf of a scheme which shuts off the restricted minority from 
effective participation in the decision. The argument that "Ne~ 
groes want to live among their own kind" hardly serves as a basis 
for confining them to that "choice." 
We have said that the Shelley decision seems inescapable. But 
when the state action issue is raised in the case of a single home~ 
owner who wishes to exclude Negroes from his property, the hal~ 
ance of constitutionally protected interests may properly be found 
to have shifted to the side of privacy, and the private control of 
property. Thus, if a tenant of a state apartment project invites all 
the white tenants of the building to an open house, the Constitution 
should not require him to invite the Negro tenants as well, even 
though the building is owned and operated by the state. The state's 
ownership indeed reduces the proprietary interest of the white 
tenant, but his personal interest in choosing his companions carries 
heavy weight. And it is vital to recognize that the interest denied 
the Negroes here is not housing, but entertainment, or association 
for its own sake.106 The fact that hypothetical cases like this one are 
typically used to demonstrate the analytical poverty of the Shelley 
opinion shows that critics of that opinion are themselves often 
104. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). 
105. In contrast, recent legislation in a few northern states and cities has been enacted 
to compel a nondiscriminatory policy by owners of various forms of private housing-
principally multiple dwellings. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-35 (1960); MICH. 
CoMP. LAws§ 750.146 (1948); N.Y. Crv. RmHTs LAw§ 18; N.Y. ExECUTIVE LAW§ 292. 
The latest New York estimate is that some 44% of the total of housing units in the state 
are covered by this legislation; for New York City, the figure is 70%. See N.Y. Times, 
May 18, 1961, p. 26, col. 5. See also C.u.. Crv. CoDE § 53. 
106. In this respect the case resembles our Case 4, p. 6 mpra. If the state were to 
forbid owners to invite Negroes to play on their property, then the interest of a punished 
owner would line up with that of the Negroes, and the impact of the discriminatory policy 
would be multiplied to cover all property, and not just that of a single owner. 
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mentally imprisoned by its words. If anything is clear it is that 
Shelley's formalism need not be extended to nonhousing cases-
or even to all housing cases. 
A few more model cases may help make the point: 
Case 17: A white tenant of an unfurnished state-owned apart-
ment project decides to sublet his apartment (including his own 
furniture) for a month during the summer but announces that no 
Negroes need apply. Across the street, similarly appointed, non-
segregated apartments are available for short-term rental at no 
greater cost. 
One may guess that the judicial balance will be struck in favor 
of the white tenant. He has little proprietary interest in the apart-
ment building, but he has a considerable proprietary-and even 
personal-interest in determining who shall occupy his mattress 
and his linen. Furthermore, the impact on Negro housing is 
minimal, because of the short-term nature of the housing in ques-
tion, because of the easy availability of other comparable housing, 
and because the discrimination is here limited to one apartment.10'T 
If the state were to forbid subletting to Negroes, then there would 
be three distinctions which would permit us to find a constitutional 
violation: (a) Not just one, but a great many apartments would be 
denied to potential Negro renters; (b) the state has no personal 
interests comparable to those of the white tenant; and (c) the 
interests of the tenant who is not permitted to sublet to a Negro 
are lined up with the Negro's. 
Case z8: In a city of 2o,ooo, one-third Negro, and at a time of 
severe housing shortage, an insurance company erects a sao-unit 
apartment development. It refuses to rent to Negroes. 
Here there is no formal connection with the state to satisfy the 
traditional requirements of state action, and yet the constitutional 
balance seems to us to demand application of fourteenth amend-
ment guarantees on the Negroes' behalf. When governmental aid 
is added, by way of obtaining the land through the exercise of emi-
nent domain powers, or tax exemption/08 or loans of money/09 the 
107. Professor Lewis would probably reach the same result, on the ground that the 
state in our hypothetical case did not intend to provide apartment facilities for use by the 
public, as distinguished from the individual tenant. See Lewis, st1pra note 89, at 1099-1102. 
108. Both were involved in Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 529, 87 
N.E.2d 541, 547 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950) (4-to-3 decision holding that 
a Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. project need not admit Negroes to tenancy under such circum-
stances). It is usually supposed that the reason for denial of certiorari was Metropolitan's 
abandonment of the policy against admission of Negroes. 
109. See, e.g., Ming v. Horgan, 3 RAcE REL. L. REP. 693 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 23, 
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only change in the alignment of constitutional interests is the re-
duction in the proprietary interest of the corporate owner.110 That 
change makes but modest difference to our analysis, but it may 
make the crucial difference to the usual state action formulation. 
The legitimate interests on the owner's side are, .first, its concern 
lest the admission of Negroes lower the demand for apartments-
a concern not justified historically, and certainly not justified at a 
time of serious shortage of housing-and second, the interest of 
its white tenants who may not want Negro neighbors. 
This "third-party" interest in nonassociation may be relevant 
not only in the context of housing, but also in education, employ-
ment, and public accommodations. A consideration of the wishes 
of persons who may not be in court does not require us to call 
the owner of the housing project (the school, the factory, etc.) 
the representative of whites who do not want association with 
Negroes; their interest is merely another circumstance proper for 
a court's attention when the balance is struck. Of course our hypo-
thetical case concerns a new apartment project, in which there are 
no present occupants who have expressed a preference for white 
neighbors. 
Suppose that the owner of the apartment project were to adopt 
a policy which did not exclude Negroes, but rather admitted them 
in a quota based on the ratio of Negroes to the whole community 
population. It might be argued that such a policy in fact increases 
the supply of better housing for Negroes, since developers who are 
assured that their apartments will not be entirely filled by Negroes 
may be more inclined to build new housing. But even the "benign 
quota" undeniably makes distinctions based on race, and if an ade-
quate connection to a branch of government can be found, there 
1958); cf. Levitt & Sons v. Division Against Discrimination, 56 N.J. Super. 542, 153 A.2d 
700 (App. Div. 1959), atfd, 31 N.J. 514, 158 A.2d 177, appeal dismissed, 363 U.S. 418 
(1960) (application of state antidiscrimination laws to private housing assisted in financing 
by the United States); New York State Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Pelham Hall 
Apts., Inc., 10 Misc. 2d 334, 170 N.Y.S.2d 750 (Sup. Ct. 1958). 
The Civil Rights Commission has urged radically increased activity by federal finance 
agencies to require lenders backed by federal guarantees to follow nondiscriminatory poli-
cies. The Commission argues forcefully that much can be done within the framework of 
existing executive authority to assure equal housing opportunities. Executive action along 
the lines of the Commission's recommendations could do much to relieve the pressure on 
the judiciary for resolving difficult issues of state action in the housing context. See 4 CIVIL 
RIGHTS Co~w'N REP., HousiNG 150-53 (1961). 
110. For an analysis of other forms of governmental assistance to private housing see 
Van Alstyne, Discrimination in State University Housing Programs-Policy and Constitu-
tional Considerations, 13 STAN. L. REv. 60 (1960). See also 34 0Ps. CAL. Arr'y GEN. 1 
(1959) (local urban redevelopment agencies may not service listings of private landlords 
who discriminate on racial grounds). 
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is no doubt that such a quota is unconstitutional when measured 
against current doctrine.111 The analysis we suggest, however, may 
give some comfort to those who support the use of a benign quota 
as an avenue to more and better Negro housing, assuming that the 
housing is nonsegregated.112 
Case 19: All real estate brokers in a suburban residential 
community consistently refuse to show houses to would-be Negro 
buyers.113 
The impact of such a practice is similar to that of a pattern of 
restrictive covenants. Both prospective sellers and buyers are se-
verely hindered in dealing, since the brokers form the main system 
of communication in the real estate market. And denial of access 
to higher class housing pushes some Negroes into poorer neighbor-
hoods, where they can pay more than other Negroes, who are in 
turn pushed into still poorer neighborhoods, and so on. 
In justification, the brokers may argue: ''We are afraid that 
property values may fall if Negroes move in, and that our future 
commissions will fall as a result; if we show to Negroes, other 
people in the community won't come to us when they need the 
assistance of brokers. Besides, we represent the people in the com-
munity who don't want to live near Negroes." These are largely 
the same arguments made in favor of the restrictive covenants. 
Since the impact of the discriminatory practice is also so similar, 
we should expect the same judicial result-application of the guar-
antees of equal protection-if it were not for the dominant formal 
view of the state action limitation. 
VIII. PuBLIC AccoMMODATIONS 
The recent rise of private organizations seeking to end segrega-
tion by extralegal, nonviolent means has directed national attention 
to racial discrimination in places of public accommodation. The 
attention is probably disproportionate, however, since Negro in-
terest in access to such accommodations is certainly subordinate 
111. Cf. Banks v. Housing Authority, 120 Cal. App. 2d 1, 260 P.2d 668 (1953), hold-
ing invalid the authority's policy of maintaining the "neighborhood pattern" in its rental 
policies, i.e., renting only to Negroes in a Negro neighborhood, etc. 
112. See Comment, 59 MicH. L. REv. 1054 (1961). 
113. This "hypothetical" case is not so hypothetical. There are, however, occasions on 
which real estate brokers break this practice even against the e.xpressed wishes of their 
sellers. See MacGregor v. Florida Real Estate Comm'n, 99 So. 2d 709, 712 (Fla. 1958) 
(alternative holding) (real estate commission may discipline broker for knowingly nego-
tiating a sale to a Jew in violation of owner's wishes). 
December 1961] STATE ACTION 53 
to their interest in more basic opportunities.114 Places of public 
accommodation have been the .first object of nonviolent demon-
strations not because Negroes want equality there before equality 
in employment, housing, or voting, but because these places are 
peculiarly vulnerable to extralegal pressure. 
Whatever the occasion for the demonstrations, a major legal 
contest will necessarily follow these extralegal attempts at desegre-
gation. The courts cannot for long avoid testing the scope of the 
demonstrators' theories of state action.115 Thus far the lower courts 
have managed to decide a number of cases,116 but uniform treat-
ment and coherent doctrine have been conspicuously absent. Typi-
cally, these cases have involved either the application of criminal 
ordinances and statutes prohibiting trespass or breach of the peace 
at the request of the proprietors or petitions by Negroes for affirma-
tive relief from discrimination. Most of the courts have resisted 
the ultimate potential applications of Shelley v. Kraemer111 and 
Marsh v. Alabama,118 and the several decisions favoring Negro 
claims have relied on a random variety of formal state connections 
to impose standards of equal protection on private businesses.119 
114. See, e.g., RoSE, THE NEGRo IN AMERICA 24 (1948). 
115. For recent discussions see Carl, Reflections on the "Sit-Ins", 46 CoRNELL L.Q. 
444 (1961); Hyman, Segregation and the Fourteenth Amendment, 4 VAND. L. REv. 555 
(1951); Pollitt, Dime Store Demonstrations: Events and Legal Problems of First Sixty 
Days, 1960 DUKE L.J. 315; Legal Aspects of the Sit-In Movement, 5 RAcE REL. L. REP. 
935 (1960); Comment, 6 VILL. L. REv. 218 (1961); Note, Lr~nch Counter Demonstra-
tions: State Action and the For~rteenth Amendment, 47 VA. L. REv. 105 (1961). 
The Supreme Court neatly avoided state action considerations in deciding the first 
sit-in case of the recent term, Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960), and relied on a 
multiplicity of connections in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 
(1961), but has granted certiorari in several others, e.g., Garner v. Louisiana, 365 U.S. 840 
(1961). A summary of the oral argument in Garner and its companion cases may be found 
in 30 U.S.L. WEEK 3125 (1961). 
116. The following cases are relevant, combining what would traditionally be viewed 
as a privately made decision to discriminate because of race, in a place of public accommo-
dation, with some involvement of formal state power to enforce the decision: Williams v. 
Hot Shoppes, Inc., 293 F.2d 835, 6 RAcE REL. L. REP. 512 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Boman v. 
Birmingham Transit Co., 280 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960); Henry v. Greenville Airport 
Comm'n, 279 F.2d 751 (4th Cir. 1960); 'Villiams v. Howard Johnson's Restaurant, 268 
F.2d 845 (4th Cir. 1959); Whiteside v. Southern Bus Lines, 177 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1949); 
Valle v. Stengel, 176 F.2d 697 (3d Cir. 1949); Henderson v. Trailway Bus Co., 194 F. 
Supp. 423, 6 RACE REL. L. REP. 467 (E.D. Va. 1961); Griffin v. Collins, 187 F. Supp. 149 
(D. Md. 1960); Slack v. Atlantic White Tower System, 181 F. Supp. 124 (D. Md.), atfd, 
284 F.2d 746 (4th Cir. 1960); Walker v. State, 103 Ga. App. 70, 118 S.E.2d 284 (1961); 
Drews v. State, 224 Md. 186, 167 A.2d 341 (1961); State v. 'Villiams, 37 CCH Lab. Cas. 
67515 (Baltimore Crim. Ct. June 10, 1959); State v. Fox, 254 N.C. 97, 118 S.E.2d 58 
(1961); State v. Williams, 253 N.C. 804, 117 S.E.2d 824 (1961); State v. Avent, 253 N.C. 
580, 118 S.E.2d 47 (1961); State v. Clyburn, 247 N.C. 455, 101 S.E.2d 295 (1958); 
Briscoe v. State, 341 S.W.2d 432 (Te."{. Crim. App. 1960); Randolph v. Commonwealth, 
119 S.E.2d 817, 6 RACE REL. L. REP. 471 (Va. Sup. Ct. App. 1961). 
117. 334 u.s. 1 (1948). 
118. 326 u.s. 501 (1946). 
119. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Boman 
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Uniformity of treatment may be a mirage. But we believe that 
a start toward coherence may be attempted through the approach 
we have outlined in the preceding sections. What remains here is 
to illustrate this technique in the area of public accommodations, 
once again through the use of hypothetical cases. 
Case 2o: The City of Chicago leases a small downtown lot to 
a man who pays a fair rental and who builds a small sandwich 
stand on the lot. This proprietor serves whites only. When several 
Negroes apply for service, and remain in their counter seats after 
being asked to leave, the proprietor complains to the police. The 
Negroes are convicted of criminal trespass in the state court. 
Case 21: A department store does eighty per cent of the busi-
ness in a small town; it sells some goods which are not available 
elsewhere in town; it serves whites only. Some Negroes refuse to 
leave the store when asked, and they are escorted to the street by 
salesmen who use a minimum of force; the Negroes sue the sales-
men for battery. A state court sustains a demurrer to their com-
plaint on the ground that the owner had a privilege to eject un-
wanted visitors. 
Acquaintance with the Supreme Court's decisions suggests that 
the conviction in Case 20 might be reversed, but that the suit in 
Case 2r is doomed. The distinction would rest on the presence or 
absence of the requisite formal state connection. Closer attention 
to the interests at stake, however, might reveal a constitutional basis 
for exactly opposite conclusions. 
The Negroes in Case 20 have an interest in obtaining a light 
refreshment and in sharing whatever associational advantages the 
facilities may have. Should further inquiry disclose the availability 
of other lunch counters, however, or the availability of other kinds 
of inexpensive eating establishments, their need to eat at this par-
ticular one becomes less substantial. Perhaps their deprivation is 
greater here than a denial of access to a penny arcade, but it is 
certainly less than denial of access to the store in Case 2r, or denial 
of access to the only motel along a roo-mile stretch of highway. 
If a man can eat at Joe's, then his need to eat at Gus's across the 
street is not pressing. 
On the other hand, the owner of the sandwich stand has a pro-
prietary interest in controlling the use of property he has built from 
v. Birmingham Transit Co., 280 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960); Valle v. Stengel, 176 F.2d 697 
(3d Cir. 1949). 
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his own earnings, reduced to the extent that the state has contrib-
uted to his facilities by making the lot available. The owner also 
has an economic interest in avoiding any potential loss of white 
customers which may result from his serving Negroes (also re-
duced to the extent that the state's willingness to lease at this lo-
cation influences his business). Finally, if the owner waits on 
customers, his own associational preferences are relevant. If ap-
plication of the equal protection clause forces him to serve Negroes, 
the impact on his associational interest is substantial; not as sub-
stantial as the impact of a similar decision on a one-man barbershop, 
perhaps, but certainly more substantial than the impact of such a 
decision on the store owners in Case 2r, who do not wait on cus-
tomers. 
At this stage of analysis, before consideration of the question 
of local responsibility, the balance suggests that Case 2r should be 
decided for the Negro plaintiffs, while the conviction of the Negro 
would-be patrons in Case 20 might be sustained. Does the latter 
conclusion square with the result in Burton v. Wilmington Park-
ing Authority r 20 We think it does; the extent to which the state's 
assistance to the sandwich stand proprietor reduces his personal 
claims does not compare with the importance of state aid in the 
Burton case. If the sandwich stand had been constructed and fur-
nished by the city, as was true of the restaurant in Burton, the 
lessee's proprietary interest would be substantially reduced. If the 
stand were in the midst of state office buildings which would pro-
vide a captive clientele, the owner's economic risk from a non-
discriminatory policy would be less. If the stand were staffed by 
employees rather than the proprietor himself, his personal interest 
in choosing associates would be less. With all these changes, Case 
20 would resemble the Burton case. Since the state has no legiti-
mate interest of its own in discrimination which might make up 
for the reduced interests of the lessee, and since the interests of 
the excluded Negroes remain at least the same as in Case 20 itself, 
in the absence of a local remedy the balance now favors applying 
the equal protection clause. 
The result which we reach in each of these cases is not affected 
by the manner in which the state may finally become involved at 
the tail end of each transaction. If the sandwich stand proprietor's 
policy did not offend the fourteenth amendment-if on balance 
120. Supra note 119. 
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his interests deserve protection even though that conclusion offends 
potential Negro customers-then he should be free to call on the 
orderly process of law to uphold those interests. Conversely, if 
potential Negro customers merit constitutional recognition for 
their claimed right to buy from the store in Case 21, it should not 
matter that policemen were not involved in the store's unconsti-
tutional conduct. The contrary conclusion not only resolves con-
stitutional issues according to procedural fortuities; it encourages 
resort to violent self-help rather than to law enforcement officers 
and the courts.121 
The availability of a local remedy may be as important in the 
constitutional balance as the availability of another lunch counter 
or department store in the same area. A public accommodations 
law, or a common-law duty of innkeepers-when conscientiously 
enforced-will serve the excluded minority at least as well as resort 
to a federal court.1.22 The need for clarification of this very issue 
led three Justices to press for remand in the Burton case. A show-
ing of local responsibility in promoting the national policy of racial 
equality may properly stay the hand of the federal judiciary. 
The assertion of local prerogative-the interest of the com-
munity in making its own decisions to prefer one set of personal 
interests over another-is another matter. On the face of things, 
the absence of a public accommodations law and the presence of a 
criminal trespass law suggest only that the community has chosen 
to vindicate certain property interests at the expense of customers 
in general. But since the white majority is normally not excluded 
by the proprietors of these accommodations, there may be reason 
to suspect that the local decision reflects support for illegitimate 
121. Yet, men who should know better continue to insist that Shelley v. K.raema 
tolerates discrimination which is "effective" without police assistance, while proprietors 
who call on the police violate the fourteenth amendment. "Where private racial discrimi-
nation is effective without help from the government, then the principle of Shelley v. 
Kraemer has no application. But where the private racial discrimination cannot be imple-
mented without governmental aid, then such aid is within the rationale of Shelley v. 
Kraemer, and is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment." KoNVITZ & L'ESKES, A CEN-
TURY OF CtVIL RIGHTS 149 (1961). 
122. For reference to the laws of twenty-six states which have e.'(tended protection 
beyond the common-law duty of innkeepers, see GREENBERG, RACE RELATioNs AND AMER-
ICAN LAw 101-14 (1959); Governor's Comm. on Human Rights, State Laws and Agencies 
for Civil Rights (multilithed materials, State of 'VJSconsin, 1960). The unsatisfactory 
nature of ordinary civil and criminal remedies has been noted, however, e.g., Van Alstyne, 
A Critique of tlze Ohio Public Accommodations Law, 22 Omo ST. L.J. 201 (1961), and 
the trend is toward the use of administrative authority armed with equity powers enforce-
able through contempt proceedings. See N.Y. ExEcUTIVE LAw §§ 290-98; Omo REv. 
CoDE ANN. §§ 4112.01-.08 (Page Supp. 1960). For a review of administrative enforce-
ment of antidiscrimination legislation, see Note, 74 HARv. L. REv. 526 (1961). 
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distinctions based on race rather than legitimate preferences for 
proprietary rights over customer rights.123 Such a conclusion is 
unavoidable when, for example, a Southern state legislature abol-
ishes the common-law duty of innkeepers as a part of a package 
of white supremacy legislation/2"' The interest in local decision-
making prerogative will not stretch so far. 
CoNCLUSION 
The Burton case furnishes our closing theme. In his opinion 
for the court, Mr. Justice Clark eschewed a unitary formula for state 
action: 
Because the virtue of the right to equal protection of the laws could lie 
only in the breadth of its application, its constitutional assurance was 
reserved in terms whose imprecision was necessary if the right were to 
be enjoyed in the variety of individual-state relationships which the 
Amendment was designed to embrace. For the same reason, to fashion 
and apply a precise formula for recognition of state responsibility under 
the Equal Protection Clause is "an impossible task" which "this Court 
has never attempted." . . • Only by sifting facts and weighing circum-
stances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct 
be attributed its true significance.125 
Such caution is well advised. But it is galling to those who yearn 
for certainty in their constitutional law. When the Court stalwardy 
insists that "private conduct abridging individual rights does no 
violence to the Equal Protection Clause,m26 while at the same time 
nimbly fetching enough connections to treat the state as the culprit, 
the Court exposes itself to the exasperation of its own members: 
The Court's opinion, by a process of .first undiscriminatingly throwing 
together various factual bits and pieces and then undermining the result-
ing structure by an equally vague disclaimer, seems to me to leave com-
pletely at sea just what it is in this record that satisfies the requirement 
of "state action."121 
123. The intrinsic bias of seemingly equal laws has been remarked upon by Anatole 
France: "The law, in its magnificent equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep 
under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread." 
124. The proliferation of antitrespass statutes (see the tables of contents to Race Rela-
tions Law Reportt:r under "Legislatures" from vol. 5, no. 2 to present) in southern states on 
the occasion of sit-in demonstrations equally suggests animus directed against Negroes, 
rather than a reasoned preference of proprietary over customer interests. For reference to 
statutes rejecting the common-law duty of innkeepers (all from border or Deep South states 
and all within the last deeade), see GJmENBERG, RACE RELATioNs AND AMERICAN LAw 97 
n.67 (1959). 
125. 365 u.s. 715, 722 (1961). 
126. Ibid. 
127. Id. at 728 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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That is the dilemma. Shall we choose formulas in the hope of 
achieving uniform and predictable results, or shall we resign our-
selves to a continual struggle with unruly legislative facts? Thus 
far the Supreme Court has, more often than not, chosen to speak 
the language of formula, whatever has been its inner motivation 
for deciding. But the bankruptcy of the formulas which have been 
announced to date has apparently caused the Court to avoid de-
ciding state action cases rather than face the formulas' implications. 
The result has been the creation of a climate of uncertainty. The 
state action cases, at least since Smith v. Allwright,m have fulfilled 
Holmes' prophecy: "Certainty generally is illusion, and repose is 
not the destiny of man.m.29 
In choosing the daily encounter with particulars, we are mind-
ful of the pitfalls on that road. The Court risks more than its own 
convenience. It risks the consequences of widespread public aware-
ness of its true function of selecting values for constitutional prefer-
ence. When the Court tells us that it is the Constitution which 
commands, we stand still for the consequences; when the Court 
tells us that on balance the interest in equal treatment outweighs 
the interest in associational choice, will we be so generous? 
In between, there is another possibility: the Court may reach 
its decisions by "sifting facts and weighing circumstances,m.ao but 
announce those decisions in the name of a formula. We prefer to 
hope that the Court will reject this policy because it is easy only 
in the short run. For one thing, formulas tend to catch up with the 
Court when they are empty. But more serious are the consequences 
of such a failing of candor for the rule of law. Law does not rule 
when the motivations behind judicial decisions are kept hidden. 
Reasoned opinions announce the law only when the stated reasons 
truly reflect the real reasons for deciding. Any of the choices open 
to the Court involves a risk; we prefer the risks of candor to those 
of deception. 
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